Water Law Review
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 6

9-1-2000

San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court: Rejecting Legislative
Favoritism in Water Right Allocations
Sean E. O'Day

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Sean E. O'Day, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court: Rejecting Legislative Favoritism in Water Right
Allocations, 4 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 29 (2000).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE V. SUPERIOR COURT:
REJECTING LEGISLATIVE FAVORITISM IN WATER
RIGHT ALLOCATIONS:
SEAN E. O'DAY'*
ABSTRACT

Water allocation in the West historically has been dominated by
the nineteenth century doctrine of prior appropriation which provides
that the first person to divert free flowing public water and apply it to a
beneficial use obtains a private right to use the water. For over a
century, irrigators, miners, and other extractive industries have viewed
their water rights acquired under the prior appropriation doctrine as
property rights, incapable of being lost except through abandonment
or forfeiture. However, late twentieth century judicial opinions have
announced that prior appropriation rights are subordinate to senior
reserved rights and have clarified that prior appropriation rights must
give when their use conflicts with states' public trust obligations.
Consequently, the reserved rights and public trust doctrines have
greatly disturbed the stable footing that prior appropriators once
enjoyed.
As the nation enters the twenty-first century, many western state
legislatures have become disturbed by the ability of the reserved rights
and prior appropriation doctrines to remove water from the hands of
current users. Already in two states, prior appropriators have turned
to their state legislatures for help. In order to protect existing water
users and the communities dependent upon prior appropriation water
rights, the Arizona and Idaho state legislatures passed legislation to
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shield prior appropriation rights from attack. Because other western
states might contemplate similar legislation, this article closely
examines the Arizona legislation and the Arizona Supreme Court
decision in San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court that declared the
legislation unconstitutional.
The article then evaluates the
implications of the Arizona decision for other western states. This
article concludes that the San Carlos decision should signal to other
western states that reserved rights are vested property rights deserving
of the same protection as other state-granted property rights, and that
the public trust doctrine should be enforced as a constitutional
obligation, which state legislatures are not free to destroy or ignore.
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Wen I was a kid in geography class,
I was taught that water alwaysflows downhill.
What I've learned since is that waterflows to money and power,
wherever they may be.
Peterson Zah, Navajo Tribal Chairman'

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1995, the Arizona State Legislature passed legislation that
severely disadvantaged tribal and federal rights to Arizona's water
resources and attempted to relieve the state of its public trust
Under pressure from large irrigators, mining
obligations.
corporations, and municipalities,3 the legislature enacted House Bills
2276 and 2193 to ensure those special interests would retain control
over the state's water supplies. In addition, the legislature eliminated
the public's right to the state's water supplies by prohibiting courts
from considering public trust principles in water right adjudications or
allocations.5
The proponents of House Bills 2276 and 2193 justified the
on the grounds the water right general stream adjudication
legislation
6
process was too lengthy, and the cost of the protracted litigation was
bankrupting smaller claimants.7 The real motivation for these bills,
8
however, involved the proponents' fear of losing their water rights in
1. Quoted in LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF
LAW ix (1991).
2. H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 17; H.B. 2193, 42d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1751.
3. The Salt River Project, Arizona Public Service, Phelps Dodge, the City of
Phoenix, and the Arizona State Land Department were the primary parties who
drafted House Bills 2276 and 2193, and lobbied for the bills' enactment. See C.J.
Adams, Water Rights Might Face Quiet Burial,ARIZONA REPUBLIC, May 11, 1996, at B7.
4. See discussion infraPart III.B.
5. H.B. 2276, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 35 (adding section 45-263 to the Arizona
Revised Statutes which provided that "[t]he public trust is not an element of a water
right .... In adjudicating the attributes of water rights pursuant to this article, the
court shall not make a determination as to whether public trust values are associated
with any or all of the river system or source").
6. A general stream adjudication is ajudicial proceeding that clarifies the rights of
individuals to use the public waters of a state. The adjudication results in a courtordered decree defining the scope and priority of all claims to a water source.
General stream adjudications are inter sese proceedings which means none of the rights
are finalized until all rights have been adjudicated. See DAR CRAMMOND, COUNTING
RAINDROPS: PROSPECTS FOR NORTHWESTERN WATER RIGHT ADJUDICATIONS 3 (1996)
(Publication of the Northwest Water Law & Policy Project, Northwestern School of
Law of Lewis & Clark College).
7. See Adams, supra note 3, at B7 (quoting the bills' co-sponsor, Representative
Rusty Bowers, as saying the legislation was needed to prevent the bankruptcy of
hundreds of small claimants whose legal costs were mounting in the adjudications).
8. The current users obtained their water rights under the prior appropriation
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these adjudications to competing claims by tribes, the federal
government, 9 and the public.
Consequently, to avoid losing their
rights in court, the current water users convinced the Arizona
Legislature to enact legislation that, in essence, wrote their water rights
into law."
Unwilling to accept legislative abrogation of their rights, several
Arizona tribes'2 filed a special action with the Arizona Supreme Court
in 1995, challenging the constitutionality of House Bills 2276 and
2193.'" In 1999, after four years of briefing and oral argument, 4 the
doctrine. Prior appropriation is an early nineteenth century doctrine that allocates

rights to water by a first in time, first in right theory. 2 WATERS AND

WATER RIGHTS §

under the reserved rights doctrine. 4

§ 37.01, at 218

12.02, at 90 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991). Under this doctrine, the party who first puts
water to a beneficial use holds a right superior to those who follow. Id. § 11.03(b), at
78. Because only commodity uses were considered beneficial during the early
nineteenth century, the prior appropriation doctrine rewarded agricultural, mining,
and other commodity users with senior rights. Id. § 11.03(a), at 77. The prior
appropriation doctrine is discussed infra Part II.A.
9. American Indian reservations and federal lands obtain their rights to water
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS

(Robert E. Beck ed., 1996). This doctrine enables tribes and other federal
reservations, such as national parks and forests, to hold a right to water in the amount
necessary to fulfill the reservation's purpose. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
600-01 (1963). The priority date of these rights is the date the reservation was
created. Id. at 600. Because the federal government often created these reservations
before prior appropriators began diverting water, reserved rights often precede the
priority date of the water rights held by the majority of current water users. See, e.g., id.
The reserved rights doctrine, and its potential to displace appropriated rights is
discussed infra Part II.B.
10. The public has a vested right to the use of the water resource under the public
trust doctrine. 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 30.02(c), at 44-45. The
public trust doctrine holds that the navigable waters within a state, the beds, and banks
of those waters, are public resources. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658
P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). The doctrine requires that
the state hold and keep these resources available for public uses, which traditionally
included fishing, commerce, and navigation, but has been expanded through judicial
interpretation to encompass recreation, aesthetics, and wildlife habitat. Id. at 718-19.
The public trust doctrine and its ability to displace current water users from their
rights is discussed infra Part II.C.
11. Together the bills contained thirty-one sections that, inter alia, re-vested senior
prior appropriators who had lost their water rights through abandonment or
forfeiture, allowed appropriators to claim older priority dates through adverse
possession, created statutory presumptions entitling prior appropriators to more water
than their actual use, re-negotiated reserved rights settlements, granted an exemption
from the general streamwide adjudication to over two-thirds of the prior appropriation
claims, and abolished the public trust doctrine. H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.,
1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 17-37; H.B. 2193, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws
1751-55. The specifics of these provisions and the effect they would have had on
federal reserved rights and the public trust doctrine are discussed infra Part III.
12. The San Carlos Apache Tribe, Tonto Apache Tribe, Yavapai Apache Tribe, and
Campe Verde ("Apache Tribes") filed the original challenge. In re Special Action
Proceedings Initiated by the Apache Tribes, No. CV-95-0161-SA (Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug.
30, 1996), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/wm/bolton/gilabolt.htm
[hereinafter Special Action Proceedings].
The Little Colorado River Tribes
(consisting of the Navajo Nation, Hopi Tribe, Pueblo of Zuni, and San Juan Southern
Paiute Tribe) and the United States later joined the Apache Tribes when the action
was referred to the superior court. Id.
13. The Arizona rules of civil procedure allow parties to file a "special action"
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Arizona Supreme Court unanimously held in San CarlosApache Tribe v.
Superior'1 several portions of the legislation unconstitutional16 because
they: (1) violated due process by elevating the relative priority of prior7
rights;'
appropriation rights, thereby retroactively disturbing reserved
(2) violated separation of powers principles by removin judicial
review of specific factual findings in the adjudications; or (3)
impermissibly relieved the state of its constitutional obligations to
manage public resources, including water, in the public trust.'9
This paper traces the evolution of House Bills 2276 and 2193 from
their enactment by the Arizona Legislature in 1995, to their rejection
by the Arizona Supreme Court in 1999. Although the tribal, federal,
and public interests ultimately prevailed, the concerns held by western
legislatures about federal reserved rights and the public trust doctrine
are not likely to disappear. Indeed, in 1996, the state of Idaho enacted
a statute that also renounced the application of the public trust
doctrine in all water allocations. 0 As federal, tribal, and public claims
to the water resource grow and increasingly threaten to displace
current water users, other western states might consider legislating
their way out of the conflict in much the same manner as Arizona and
Idaho. Consequently, other state courts soon might confront issues
similar to those decided by the Arizona Supreme Court, and could,
therefore, profit from the wisdom and integrity shown by that court in
its resolution of these legally and politically difficult issues.
This paper begins, in Part II, with a brief overview of the prior
appropriation, reserved rights, and public trust doctrines, and explains
how current users who claim rights under the prior appropriation
directly in the state's supreme court for cases which require urgent disposition. See

ARiz. R. P. SPEcIAL AcTION 1. Despite the court's recognition of the need for urgent
disposition of the case, it took almost four years to resolve.
14. After accepting the petition, the supreme court ordered the case to proceed in
the Arizona Superior Court, Arizona's trial court. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior
Court, 972 P.2d 179, 187 (Ariz. 1999). Following oral argument and briefing, the
superior court certified its decision to the Arizona Supreme Court, where the supreme
court independently reviewed those portions of the legislation argued before the
superior court. Id.
15. Id. at 202.
16. In total, the Arizona Supreme Court invalidated twenty-one separate provisions
of the water right legislation. Id. at 201-02.
17. Id. at 188-93.
18. Id. at 195-98.
19. Id. at 199. The Arizona Supreme Court is not the first court to conclude that
See infra note 86 and
the public trust doctrine is a constitutional doctrine.
accompanying text. That court also is not the first to conclude that the public trust
doctrine applies to water. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. The Arizona
Supreme Court, however, is only the second court to decide that the doctrine is both
constitutional and applies to water rights. The North Dakota Supreme Court was the
first court to so decide. See United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation
Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461-62 (N.D. 1976).
20. H.B. 794, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 1147 (codified at
IDAHO CODE § 58-1201 to -1203 (Michie 2000)). The Idaho legislature passed House
Bill 794 "to clarify the application of the public trust doctrine in the state of Idaho and
to expressly declare [its] limits." IDAHO CODE § 58-1201(6) (Michie 2000).
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doctrine could lose their water to those users claiming rights under the
reserved rights or public trust doctrines. Part II concludes with a
discussion of three approaches states have taken to resolve these
conflicts: litigation, settlement, and legislation. Part III extends the
discussion of the legislative approach by outlining the Arizona
Legislature's attempt to secure water for prior appropriators over
reserved rights and public trust claims. Part III begins with a brief
history of House Bills 2276 and 2193, and describes the effect the
legislation would have had on public and reserved rights. That Part
also explains the danger in allowing state legislatures complete
discretion in apportioning legal rights to natural resources. Part IV
traces the challenge to House Bills 2276 and 2193 from the superior
court to the Arizona Supreme Court, and examines the reasoning
behind the Arizona Supreme Court's decision to hold portions of the
legislation unconstitutional. Part V explores the implications that
decision might have in Arizona and other western states, like Idaho,
which have or may attempt to pass similar protective legislation. The
paper concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision should
guide other western states in recognizing reserved rights as vested
property rights and the public trust doctrine as a constitutional
obligation, so that neither would be subject to revocation by state
legislatures.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A fierce battle exists in every western state between those who are
currently using water under rights obtained through the state law of
prior appropriation and those who claim rights to the same water
under a federal theory of reserved rights. Adding to the conflict are
public interest groups who believe that some diversions are violating
Understanding this conflict
the state's public trust obligations.
requires a review of the legal basis from which each group claims
rights to the same water. Accordingly, this Part outlines the prior
appropriation, reserved rights, and public trust doctrines and traces
the evolution of today's conflict. This Part ends by discussing three
ways states have attempted to address the conflict, including efforts
taken by the Arizona and Idaho state legislatures to ensure that they
are the institutions deciding the winners and losers in this battle.
A. THE DOCTRINE OF PRIOR APPROPRIATION

The doctrine of prior appropriation" is the dominant system in the
21. The origin of the prior appropriation doctrine is generally attributed to the
customs of gold miners who considered the riparian system of the East, which grants
private land owners bordering a watercourse a correlative right to use the water on
immediately adjacent land, unworkable in the arid and mountainous West where water
was scarce and valuable minerals were often located on public lands several miles from
the streams and rivers. See A. Dan Tarlock, The ChangingMeaning of Water Conservation

in the West, 66 NEB. L. REv. 145, 152 (1987). Because there was not enough water to
meet the demand, the miners applied the same custom to water as they had to gold:
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West for acquiring a private property right to the use of public water.2"
Essentially a rule of capture, the doctrine holds that the first person to
divert water23 and put it to beneficial use obtains a property right to the
continued use of the water.24 Because the doctrine is based on state
law, 5 the specific contours of the doctrine vary state by state. However,
as its name suggests, at the core of the doctrine lie two principles that
remain consistent among all prior appropriation states: appropriation
of water for a beneficial use and priority based on a first in time, first
in right philosophy.
Although "beneficial use" forms a core principle of the prior
appropriation doctrine, as a leading water law commentator noted, "it
Today most courts understand
is seldom defined with precision."
industrial and general
irrigation,
that beneficial use includes domestic,
27
Most states, however, do not recognize
municipal uses.
appropriations for purely aesthetic purposes as beneficial uses. As
first in time, first in right. John D. McGowen, The Development of PoliticalInstitutions on
the PublicDomain, 11 WvO. L.J. 1, 14 (1956). Although the rule developed from mining
practices, settlers also applied it to irrigation and other water uses. See id. As priority
disputes among water users arose, western courts adopted the mining customs as law.
See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146-47 (1855). Beginning with Wyoming in 1890,
western state legislatures soon thereafter codified the doctrine into statute. SeeJOSEPH
L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 245 (2d ed. 1991).
22. See SAX ET AL., supra note 21, at 149. Nine states follow the prior appropriation
doctrine exclusively: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Id. California, Oklahoma, and Nebraska have mixed
water law systems that recognize both riparian and prior appropriation doctrines. Id.
Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Oregon, and Washington formerly had
mixed systems but have since moved exclusively to a system of prior appropriation. Id.
23. Historically, the diversion requirement comprised a core principle of a water
right and still can be found in many state statutes. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 8, § 12.03(c)(1), at 106 & n.90. However, the diversion requirement has
been relaxed by some states in recognition of instream uses as a beneficial use. See,
e.g., Neb. Game & Parks Comm'n v. 25 Corp., 463 N.W.2d 591, 603-04 (Neb. 1990);
Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water Admin., 530 P.2d 924, 928-29 (Idaho 1974); see
also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1999) (defining beneficial use to include
minimum instream flows). Those states that do recognize water rights for instream
flows, however, do not allow private parties to obtain rights to instream flows. See, e.g.,
id. Rather, those states only allow the state or federal government to claim waters for
instream purposes. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream Flow Rights: "New"
Public Western Water Rights, 25 ROcKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 24-1, 24-1 (1979).
24. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 8, § 12.02, at 90.
25. With the exception of reserved rights, discussed infra in Part II.B., water law is
primarily based on the law of the state in which the water is found. See generally 2
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 8, § 11.03(a), at 76-78. Although Congress has
the power to regulate the nation's waters through the Property and Commerce
Clauses of the United States Constitution, it left the creation, definition, and control
of private water rights to the states in order to encourage western settlement. Id.
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
26. George A. Gould, Water Rights Systems, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE FiFY STATES AND
TERRITORIES 6, 10 (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1990).
27. William R. Fischer & Ward H. Fischer, AppropriationDoctrine, in WATER RIGHTS
OFTHE FIFTYSTATES AND TERRITORIES 23, 26 (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1990).
28. Id. Indeed, the concept of what constitutes beneficial use is largely tied to
nineteenth century values. As Professor Michael C. Blumm notes: "This crude,
nineteenth century allocation system rewarded early diversion by agricultural, mining,
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noted already, an appropriator must prove a beneficial use to create a
water right. Once the right has been created, the beneficial use
principle also defines the quantity 9 and characteristic of use 0 of the
water right. In this regard, many statutes provide that beneficial use
"
serves as the "basis, measure and limit to the use of the water.01
Implicit in the beneficial use principle lies the notion that the
appropriator will make a continued efficient use of the water. 2
Accordingly, once an appropriator has perfected a water right,3 the
right cannot be extinguished
unless the appropriator later abandons4
3
or forfeits that right.
The rule of temporal priority provides the other core principle of
prior appropriation. Under the rule of temporal priority, the first
person who "appropriates water and puts it to beneficial use thereby
acquires a vested right to continue to divert and use that quantity of
water against all claimants junior to him in point of time." 6 In times of
shortage, the priority system operates to reduce junior appropriators'
withdrawals so that senior water right holders may continue to receive

and other commodity users." Michael C. Blumm, Unconventional Waters: The Quiet
Revolution in Federaland TribalMinimum Stream Flows, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 445, 446 (1992).
"Prior appropriation ignored long-range planning, conservation, water quality, and
the needs of foreign governments, Indian tribes, recreation, and wildlife habitat." Id.
29. As a quantity requirement, beneficial use limits an appropriator's right to that
amount which the appropriator is able to put to beneficial use in any given year upon
particular land. 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 8, § 14.03(c) (4) (A), at 18586.
30. As a characteristic of use, the beneficial use principle holds that the
appropriator must continue using the water for beneficial purposes. See2 WATERSAND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 8, § 12.03(c)(2), at 106-07, § 14.03(c) (4) (A), at 186. If the
water is used for another purpose, the appropriator will lose his water right. Id.
31. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141 (West 1999).
Virtually identical
pronouncements exist in the statutes of a number of other states. See NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 533.035 (Michie 1999); N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 3; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-2
(Michie 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-01.2 (1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 540.610(1)
(1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 46-1-8 (1999); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-101 (1999).
32. See generally Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient
Searchfor Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 985 (1998) (noting that due
to meager administrative enforcement, the beneficial use element has not resulted in
an efficient use of scarce western water).
33. Perfection is a term of art signifying that an appropriator has established a
water right by fulfilling the statutory requirements. See generally 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 8, § 14.03(d)(1), at 194-200. These statutory requirements usually
take the form of a permit system. SAX ET AL., supra note 21, at 245 ("Today every prior
appropriation state except Colorado provides for the acquisition of water rights
through an administrative permit system").
34. Abandonment is a common law rule that allows an appropriator to release his
water rights when the following conditions are met: nonuse of the water coupled with
an intent to forsake the right and not repossess the use of the water. WELLS A.
HUTCHINS, SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEST 389 (1942).

35. Forfeiture, which is based on statute, does not require intent. Id. at 392, 395.
Forfeiture involves the forced loss of the water right based upon the appropriator's
failure to perform some act required by statute within a prescribed period of time. See
id. at 392-94.
36. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555 (1963).
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all of the water to which they are entitled.37 Consequently, the rule of
temporal priority gives senior users the right to continued use of the
water as it existed at the time they perfected their rights, while
allowing junior users the ability to use water that is in excess of senior
appropriators' needs."
Together, beneficial use and temporal priority operate to give
appropriators security and predictability in the amount of water they
will receive each year. 9 Because the West has an arid climate where
water is scarce and timing of precipitation unpredictable,40 water users
need a flexible yet reliable system for allocating water supplies. In
theory, the doctrine of prior appropriation provides the best solution
to this situation. 4' Rather than require appropriators to share equally
the burden of shortages which, due to their size and frequency, could
produce widespread economic ruin, the rule of temporal priority gives
senior users the security that they can continue diverting the same
amount of water to which they have become accustomed.42 Prior
appropriation also benefits junior users because the beneficial use rule
limits the quantity of senior rights to a precise amount, thereby
allowing junior appropriators to rely upon the condition of the stream

37. The priority system works as follows: once a water right is established, the right
is assigned a priority date. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 8, § 12.03(b), at
92. The date the appropriator applied for a water permit becomes the priority date
for the water right in question. Id. If the senior water right user is not receiving the
full amount of his right, he may ask the state to shut off diversions of appropriators
with lesser priority. SeeFRANKJ. TRELEASE, CASE AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 105 (3d
ed. 1979).
The process by which a senior appropriator calls upon a junior
appropriator to stop his diversions is termed "a call out" or "calling the river." Id. If
shutting down the junior appropriator's withdrawal does not improve the senior's
water supply, it is termed a "futile call." Id.; Harrison C. Dunning, The "Physical
Solution" in Western Water Law, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 445, 466 & n.116 (1986); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(2)(d) (1999).
38. See generally 2 WATERS AND WATERRIGHTS, supra note 8, § 12.03(b), at 92-94.
39. See HUTCHINS, supra note 34, at 328. Prior appropriation, however, has come
under attack on economic, technical, and allocative efficiency grounds. Tarlock, supra
note 21, at 152-60 (noting that the prior appropriation doctrine's legacy upholds fair
distribution over efficiency); see also Harrison C. Dunning, State Equitable Apportionment
of Western Water Resources, 66 NEB. L. REv. 76, 76-119 (1987) (asserting that departures
from the prior appropriation doctrine occur when states equitably apportion water
resources).
40. Even in the reputed rainy Pacific Northwest, demand for water often exceeds
the available supply. See Michael C. Blumm, Seven Myths of Northwest Water Law and
Associated Stories, 26 ENVTL. L. 141, 141-42 (1996).
41. The prior appropriation doctrine has been, perhaps, too successful in its ability
to encourage development of water. Freshwater withdrawals in the western United
States, including Alaska and Hawaii, were estimated at 179 million acre-feet of water
per year from 1960 to 1990. WAYNE B. SOLLEY, ESTIMATES OF WATER USE IN THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES IN 1990 AND WATER-USE TRENDS 1960-90: REPORT TO THE
Water used for
WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION v (1997).
irrigation and livestock was the largest use category at an estimated 140 million acrefeet of water per year. Id. Domestic and commercial uses were estimated at 17.5
million acre-feet per year. Id. An acre-foot of water is the amount of water that will
cover one acre of land to a depth of one foot. It is equivalent to 43,560 cubic feet, or
approximately 325,851 gallons of water.
42. Gould, supranote 26, at 12.
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at the time they found it. Similarly, the principles of abandonment
and forfeiture unlock water that once was perfected but is no longer
being used. Consequently, prior appropriation is perhaps best
some legal
explained as an attempt to provide appropriators with
43
certainty in an otherwise climatically uncertain resource.
B. THE RESERVED RIGHTS DOCTRINE

Although prior appropriation has been the dominant method for
acquiring a water right in the West, it is not the exclusive means of
doing so. American Indian tribes and the federal government both
claim water rights under a distinct legal framework called the reserved
rights doctrine." Based on federal law, the reserved rights doctrine
holds that when the United States sets aside or reserves public lands
for a particular use or purpose, it reserves, by implication, any
unappropriated water, whether from a navigable or non-navigable
necessary to accomplish the primary purpose of
source, to the• extent
41
the reservation.
The doctrine's origin is attributed to the United States Supreme
Court's 1908 decision in Winters v. United States.4" The dispute in
Winters involved competing claims by tribes and early settlers to water
in a river bordering the tribe's reservation.4 ' The case began when the
United States brought suit on behalf of the tribes of the Fort Belknap
Reservation in Montana 48 to enjoin diversions of water from the Milk
River by irrigators who claimed rights to the water under the state's
prior appropriation doctrine. 49 The settlers claimed they had a right to
the water under the doctrine of prior appropriation because they had
started diverting the water before the tribes. ° The tribes claimed that
the agreement creating the Fort Belknap Reservation 5' reserved water
rights to the Milk River for the tribes regardless of when the tribes

43. BURTON, supra note 1, at 80.
44. 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 37.01, at 218. The reserved rights
doctrine stands as an exception to the federal government's general policy of
acquiescing to state control of water resources. United States v. Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,
715 (1978).
45. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1976); Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 599-601 (1963); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
46. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576.
47. Id. at 565. The facts of the case are presented here for two reasons. First, the
facts of Winters are typical of the type of dispute that still arises today between federal
reservations and prior appropriators. Second, the facts of Winters powerfully illustrate
how the reserved rights doctrine can displace current water users who claim rights
under the doctrine of prior appropriation.
48. For the history of the Fort Belknap Reservation and the background of the
Winters case see Norris Hundley, Jr., The "Winters" Decision and Indian Water Rights: A
Mystery Reexamined, 13 W. HIsT. Q. 17, 19-32 (1982) and DANIEL McCOOL, COMMAND
OF THE WATERS: IRON TRIANGLES, FEDERAL WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER 3649 (1987).
49. Winters, 207 U.S. at 568-69.
50. Id.
51. Act of May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113-14.
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actually used the water.2 Although the agreement lacked an express
provision reserving water for the tribes, the Supreme Court ruled that
the tribes indeed had the better right to the water.5 ' The Court did
not clearly specify the basis of the tribe's right. Instead, the Court
reasoned that the policy of the United States to transform American
Indians into a "pastoral and civilized people" would be defeated and
the reservation's land rendered "practically valueless," if water rihts
based on prior appropriation were able to defeat the tribe's claim.
Almost fifty years later, in 1963, the Supreme Court affirmed and
clarified the parameters of the Winters decision in Arizona v.
California.55 That case expanded the doctrine in several respects. First,
the Court clarified that federal reservations, other than tribal
reservations, were also entitled to reserved water rights. 6 Second, the
Court announced that reserved rights were measured by the amount
to fulfill the government's purposes in creating the
of water necessary
• 57
In the case of tribal reservations, the Court explained
reservation.
that where the purpose of the reservation in question was to allow
American Indians to become agrarian people, the tribe's water rights
are measured by the amount of water needed to irrigate all of the
practicably irrigable acreage within the reservation." Third, the Court
clarified that reserved water rights vested when the United States
created the reservation, regardless of whether the water has actually
been put to use.59 Fourth, and perhaps of most concern to prior
52.

Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 573-74.

53. Id. at 576-77.
54. Id. at 576.
55. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
56. Id. at 601. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California, the
courts have recognized federal reserved rights in national parks and monuments,
national forests, wildlife refuges, and even Bureau of Land Management lands that
had been withdrawn from the public domain. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,
141 (1976) (ruling the federal government entitled to reserve water in Devil's Hole
National Monument in quantities sufficient to protect the desert pupfish); Unites
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 711-13 (1978) (acknowledging reserved rights for
the primary purpose of national forests); United States v. Alaska, 423 F.2d 764, 766-67
(9th Cir. 1970) (ruling the Kenai National Moose Range entitled to reserved rights);
United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 32 (Colo. 1982) (recognizing
reserved rights to public springs and watering holes under the Public Water Reserve, a
1926 Executive Order, but limiting the reservation to prevent monopolization of the
water by a single use).
57. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600-01. In 1978, the Supreme Court demonstrated that
the purposes of non-tribal reservations are determined by examining the
congressional or executive act creating the reservation. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at
705-08. The reservation's purpose, however, is to be narrowly construed, thereby
entitling the reservation to only enough water necessary to fulfill its minimal needs.
See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. at 138-39.
58. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600. Not all tribal reservations, however, were created for
agricultural purposes. Many treaty documents recite specific language reserving
hunting, fishing, or gathering rights. In these cases, quantification is based upon the
amount of water necessary for optimal instream flows to sustain fish or riparian areas.
See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252 (1984).
59. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600.
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appropriators, the Court held that the tribal reserved rights took the
date of the reservation's creation as a priority
date, giving right of
60
priority against all subsequent appropriators.
The Arizona v. California decision marked the beginning of the
conflict between prior appropriators and reserved rights claimants.
Until 1963, according to one account, "many state water officials
appear[ed] to have doubted that the Winters [sic] doctrine was real or
meaningful., 61
Until Arizona v. Calfornia, many states granted
appropriators rights to use water without any regard for potential
reserved rights claims. That decision, however, made appropriators
and western states realize that because many current water users had
water rights with priority dates after the establishment of reservations,
those prior appropriation rights were subordinate to any claims that
the tribes or federal government might bring.63 Consequently, the fact
that the United States, as trustee for the tribes, did not begin to assert
tribal or federal reserved rights until the 1960s, understandably has
created a tension between prior appropriators who currently possess
the water and reserved right claimants who may have better legal title
to the water.64
Inherent legal conflicts between the reserved rights and prior
60. Id. However, in the case of tribal reservations where the purpose of the
reservation is to preserve pre-existing uses such as fishing or hunting, the priority date
will be "time immemorial." Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414.
61. Edward Weinberg & Richmond F. Allan, FederalReserved Water Rights, in WATER
RIGHTS OF THE FIFYSTATES AND TERRITORIES 74, 76 (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1990).
62. The states often did so with the support of the United States government. In
1973, the National Water Commission explained that
[flollowing Winters... the United States was pursuing a policy of
encouraging the settlement of the West and the creation of family-sized farms
on its arid lands. In retrospect, it can be seen that this policy was pursued
with little or no regard for Indian water rights and the Winters doctrine. With
the encouragement, or at least the cooperation, of the Secretary of the
Interior-the very office entrusted with protection of all Indian rights-many
large irrigation projects were constructed on the streams that flowed through
or bordered Indian Reservations, sometimes above and more often below the
Reservations. With few exceptions the projects were planned and built by the
Federal Government without any attempt to define, let alone protect, prior
rights that Indian tribes might have had in the waters used for the
projects.... In the history of the United States Government's treatment of
Indian tribes, its failure to protect Indian water rights for use on the
Reservations it set aside for them is one of the sorrier chapters.
UNITED STATES NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: FINAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE NATIONAL
WATER COMMISSION 474-75 (1973).
63. See BURTON, supra note 1, at 29 (noting that Arizona v. California made it

apparent that reserved rights was a force to be reckoned with).
64. The tension was evident in the Western States Water Council's 1997 report to
the Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission. WESTERN STATES WATER
COUNCIL, WATER IN THE WEST TODAY: A STATES' PERSPECTIVE, REPORT TO THE WESTERN
WATER POLICy REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION 17-18 (1997). In the report, the Council
indicated that a primary goal of every western state was to provide a reliable and
adequate source of water to meet growing demands. Id. at vii. However, concern
"about the claims being exerted by Indian tribes to water resources and the potential
of such claims to disrupt existing rights in non-Indian communities" ranked as a main
obstacle to reaching this goal. Id.
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appropriation doctrines have added to this tension. For example,
unlike state prior appropriation rights, the United States can create
federal reserved rights without a diversion or a beneficial use.65
of
Reserved rights hold a priority date corresponding to the creation
66
the reservation, not the appropriation or diversion of water. 6 They
cannot be lost through non-use, and are quantified by the purpose of
67
the reservation rather than by demonstrated prior use.
Consequently, the reserved rights doctrine has eroded the stabilizing
effects of the prior appropriation doctrine. 8
Following Arizona v. California,states fought to establish state court
jurisdiction over all federal reserved rights, including American Indian
reserved rights, under the provisions of the McCarran Amendment
("Amendment"). 69 Congress passed the Amendment in 1952 to allow
state parties to join the United States government as a party in state
court water rights adjudications.70 Despite concerns by the tribes and
the federal government that they would not receive a fair forum in
state court, the Supreme Court affirmed, in a series of three opinions,
that the Amendment applies to all federal reserved rights, including
tribal rights.72 Since those decisions, most state courts have been
predictably grudging towards reserved rights. 3 The Supreme Court,
65. United States v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 494 (Colo. 1987) (cataloguing the
differences between the two doctrines).
66. Id.

67. Id.
68. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the security
and predictability of the prior appropriation doctrine.
69. Department ofJustice Appropriation Act of 1953 § 208, 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
70. Id.
71. SeeArizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 566 (1983) (tribes argued
that state courts were a prejudicial forum).
72. See United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971) (unanimous
opinion holding the Amendment an "all inclusive" statute which made no exception
for reserved rights); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 819 (1976) (after noting that the Amendment allows for concurrent jurisdiction
in both state and federal courts, the court held that federal water rights are more
appropriately determined in state court for reasons of judicial efficiency and
expertise); San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 564, 569 (holding that despite state
enabling act provisions which divest the state of any authority over tribes, the federal
government as the trustee of American Indian reserved rights can be compelled to
litigate tribal water rights in state court, under the Amendment, and that such
litigation will be binding on the tribes). See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS,
supra note 9, § 37.04(a)(1), at 273-75 (discussing the enactment of the Amendment
and its subsequent interpretation by courts). But see Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme
Court's New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the McCarranAmendment: Toward EndingState
Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 433, 435 (1994) (arguing
the Court followed an improper path in extending jurisdiction over tribal water right
claims to state courts).
73. See, e.g., United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 22-28 (Colo.
1982) (rejecting instream flows for timber and watershed projection purposes,
rejecting a 1960 priority date for non-consumptive uses in a national forest, and
rejecting flows for whitewater rafting in a national monument); In re Gen.
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 99100 (Wyo. 1988) (holding that groundwater is not subject to reserved right claims);
New Mexico ex rel. Martinez v. Lewis, 861 P.2d 235, 237-38 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)
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however, cautioned states not to affect the substance of a reserved
rights claim."4 Consequently, the prior appropriator's home field
advantage has done little to abate the potential for reserved rights
claimants, where senior, to displace current users.75
C. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

Reserved rights are not the only threat to current water users.
Recent judicial opinions have recognized that prior appropriation
rights are also subject to state public trust obligations and may be
"divested" when an appropriator's diversions conflict with the public's
interest in the water. Unlike prior appropriation or reserved rights
which entitle the holder to a property right in a specific amount of
water, the public trust doctrine imposes a fiduciary obligation on the
state, as sovereign, to preserve and protect public trust resources,
including water, for the general public. 7 In this sense, the public trust
doctrine is the public's water right.
The seminal case discussing the public trust doctrine is Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.78 At issue in Illinois Centralwas whether
the Illinois legislature could revoke a conveyance of title to the Illinois
Central Railroad to the bed of Lake Michigan along the Chicago
waterfront.7 9 According to the Court, these lands were "held in trust
for the people of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the
waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing
therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties."
Consequently, the Court noted that the state could "no more abdicate
its trust over property in which the whole people are interested...
than it can abdicate its police powers."'" The Court also noted that
while the state could delegate the power to use these lands to another
body, the delegation would always be subject to the state's right to
revoke these powers8 2 Therefore, the Court held that the legislature
could rescind the conveyance. 83
Although the Court did not clarify in Illinois Central whether the
(upholding a trial court award of 2,322.4 acre-feet of water to the Mesacalero Apache

Tribe although the tribe was entitled to 17,750 acre-feet of water under the practicably

irrigable acreage "PIA"standard).

74. See San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571 ("[A]ny state-court decision alleged

to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can expect to receive...
exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal interest in safeguarding
those rights from state encroachment").
75.

See Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d at 101, 103 (finding the Wind River tribes

entitled to many thousand acre-feet of water, using the PIA method, that had been
previously used by prior appropriators).
76.
77.
78.
79.

See discussion infra notes 96-120.
See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 9, § 30.02 (b) (1), at 43.
I1. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id. at 452.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 453.
82.

Id. at 453-54.

83. Id. at 459-62.

Issue I

SAN CARLOS A PA CHE TRIBE

public trust doctrine is based on state or federal law, the Court
announced in a subsequent opinion that the case was decided on state
law principles. 4 Today, almost every western state has adopted the
public trust doctrine. 5 Only a handful of these states have recognized
that the doctrine is of constitutional proportions.8 6 Other states and
commentators have intimated that the doctrine derives from state
8
87
common law, state enabling acts," or state water codes.89 For many
western states, the origin of the doctrine remains an open issue.
While Illinois Central focused on the state's obligation to protect the
public's right to navigate, fish, and conduct commerce upon navigable
waters, state courts have expanded obligations under the doctrine to
include protection of other public values such as ecological
preservation," wildlife,9' recreation, 2 and aesthetics.93 In addition, the

84. SeeAppleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926).
85. See Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 166 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1991); Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990); Owsichek
v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988); Caminiti v.
Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987); Dep't of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d
948, 952 (Mont. 1985); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle
Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 1983); Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands,
581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. Ct. App. 1978); United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water
Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 460 (N.D. 1976); Texas v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d
579, 587 (Tex. 1961). Although New Mexico and Wyoming have yet to embrace the
public trust doctrine explicitly, these states nevertheless recognize public rights in
water very similar to what the public trust doctrine provides. See New Mexico ex rel.
State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 427 (N.M. 1945)
(recognizing public fishing rights despite private ownership of the bed of a nonnavigable river); Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 145 (Wyo. 1961) (finding the
Wyoming constitution gave the public an easement to float on non-navigable waters of
the state).
86. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999)
(holding that the public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on the legislature);
Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993) (noting that the public
trust doctrine is partially encapsulated in WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1); CWC Fisheries,
Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1120-21 (Alaska 1988) (holding that AIASKA CONST. art
VIII, § 3 embodies the states public trust doctrine obligations); Gait v. Mont. Dep't of
Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 731 P.2d 912, 914-15 (Mont. 1987) (stating that the public trust
doctrine is found at MoNT. CONST.art. IX, § 3(3)); United Plainsmen Ass'n, 247 N.W.2d
at 461 (finding the public trust doctrine in N.D. CONST. art. XVII, § 210).
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 718.
87. See, e.g.,
88. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the TraditionalDoctrine, 19 ENVrL. L. 425, 441-43 (1988-1989).
89. See Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust
in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 715 & n.99 (1995).
90. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (Doctrine includes
preservation of tidelands "so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study,
as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and
marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area").
91. See, e.g., id.
92. See, e.g., Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the Sea, 294 A.2d 47,
54-55 (N.J. 1972) (holding public trust "not limited to the ancient prerogatives of
navigation and fishing, but extend [s]as well to recreational uses").
93. See, e.g., Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085,
1095 (Idaho 1983) (holding public trust values include "navigation, fish and wildlife
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states have expanded the geographical scope of the doctrine beyond
just the beds of navigable waters. 4 The most contentious area of
expansion, however, involves the application of the doctrine to the
appropriation of the water resource. Nearly a half dozen states have
held the public trust extends beyond the beds to include the water as a
trust resource as well."5 The leading case applying the public trust
doctrine in the water rights context is the California Supreme Court's
Mono Lake decision. 96
The facts of Mono Lake illustrate how the public trust doctrine can
displace current water users. In Mono Lake, the City of Los Angeles
diverted water from four of the five streams flowing into Mono Lake
under water rights it obtained in 1940."7 By 1970, the City's diversions
had caused the level of Mono Lake to drop significantly from its
historical level, thereby increasing the salinity of the lake and causing a
marked deterioration of the lake's ecology.98 To prevent further
deterioration, lakefront residents and environmental groups sued to
enjoin the City from making further diversions.99 They based their
complaint on the public trust doctrine. 00 The superior court ruled
against the environmental groups, concluding that the public trust
doctrine did not apply to water rights.'
The California Supreme
Court reversed, holding the water was trust property such that the
public trust doctrine could be invoked to protect the lake and its
natural resources.12
associated
According to the court, the public trust doctrine compels state
habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality").
94. See, e.g.,
Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass'n v. Idaho ex rel. Andrus, 899 P.2d 949, 953-54
(Idaho 1995) (holding that the public trust indirectly limited state actions on state
school endowment lands that have detrimental affect on public trust resources);
Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114, 121-22 (Mass. 1966) (public
trust applies to state parklands); Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571, 574 (N.J.
1978) (holding municipally owned beach subject to public trust doctrine); Colman v.
Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 635-36 (Utah 1990) (public trust applies to
causeway providing access to canal). See also Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is
It Amphibious?, 1J. ENVrL. L. & LimG. 107, 116 (1986).
95. See Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 89, at 735 (noting that California, North
Dakota, Idaho, Washington, Montana, Alaska, and probably Oregon recognize public
trust obligations in the water resource). While Illinois Centralfocused on the doctrine's
application to beds of navigable waters, extending the doctrine to include the water
above these lands has strong logical appeal because the doctrine ultimately protects
water-dependent public interests such as navigation, fishing, and aesthetics. Colorado
is the only state to consider and reject a public trust in water. See People v. Emmert,
597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979). Kansas has rejected the public trust in nonnavigable waters overlying private lands. Kansas ex reL Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356,
1364 (Kan. 1990).
96. Nat'l Audubon Socy v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983) (often referred to by the water body involved, Mono Lake)
[hereinafter Mono Lake].
97. Id. at 711.
98. Id. at 715.
99. Id. at 712.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 721.
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courts and agencies to consider the effects water diversions will have
upon interests protected by the public trust before approving water
1 3
diversions either through a permit or adjudication. 0 The court
rejected the City's argument that the water could no longer be subject
to the public trust doctrine once an appropriator acquires a "vested"
right to use the water.0 4 Instead, in relying upon the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning in Illinois Central, the court announced
that the state could not avoid its public trust obligations simply by
05
conveying an interest in the water to a private party.' Consequently,
to the use of
rights
the court held that private individuals who acquire
the water hold those rights subject to the public trust.
The court also explained that because vested water rights were
subject to the trust, the state could revoke those use rights when doing
07
so was in the best interests of the trust. According to the California
Supreme Court,
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust
imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of
the appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign power to allocate
water resources in the public interest, the state is not confined by past
allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.'
Therefore, under Mono Lake, water rights granted by a state are not
indefeasibly vested rights because they were given, and will always
remain, subject to the obligation of the state to manage the water
9
resources in the public's best interests.
Despite the potential of the public trust doctrine to reform current
water right systems, other courts have been cautious in allowing the
Nonetheless, an
doctrine to fully displace existing water rights."
rights given by
water
that
recognized
have
courts
of
number
increasing
before Mono
decade
a
Nearly
trust.
public
the
to
subject
the state are
Conservation
Water
State
Dakota
North
v.
Ass'n
Plainsmen
Lake, in United
the public
that
held
Court
Supreme
Dakota
Commission, the North
constitution,"'
state's
the
and
statute
in
trust doctrine, embodied

103. Id. at 728.
104. Id. at 723, 729.
105. Id. at 721-23.
106. Id. at 723.
107. Id. at 723-24, 728-29.
108. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 728.
109. In addition to clarifying the relationship between the public trust doctrine and
water rights, Mono Lake made five other large contributions to public property law.
For a complete analysis of Mono Lake, and its effect throughout the West, see Blumm &
Schwartz, supra note 89.
110. See Michael C. Blumm, et al., Renouncing the Public Trust Doctrine:An Assessment of
the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 461, 465-66 (1997) (noting that
courts have generally tried to accommodate the public trust doctrine within the
dominant private property rights regime).
111. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
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prevented the state from granting water rights without first engaging
in a comprehensive plan that assessed the effect on public trust
resources.
The Idaho Supreme Court also has recognized the ability of the
public trust to divest existing water users of their water rights."' In
1995, in Idaho Conservation League v. State, the court denied
environmental groups the ability to represent public interests in an
ongoing water right adjudication because the adjudication sought to
determine only the priority of water rights based on the rules of prior
appropriation."'
Although it denied the environmental groups'
intervention, the court did note that the appropriation rights under
adjudication were impressed already with a public trust, stating that
the "public trust doctrine takes precedent even over vested water
rights." "5 Therefore, while the Idaho Supreme Court did not agree
that litigating public trust concerns was necessary for a complete
adjudication, it nonetheless preserved the paramount nature of the
doctrine for future cases.116
The most recent state to join this trend is Arizona. In San Carlos
Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to

allow the state legislature to prevent courts from considering public
trust doctrine considerations in water right adjudications." 7 In making
this determination, the court indicated that water rights were subject
to the public trust, and that the ultimate "determination depends on
the facts before ajudge."' 8 While the court did not indicate what facts
would be sufficient to allow the doctrine to affect a specific water right,
its holding clearly indicates that the state cannot ignore its public trust
obligations when dispensing public resources, including state water
rights."9
457, 461-62 (N.D. 1976).

112. Id.at463.
113. See Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085,
1092-94 (Idaho 1983); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448 (Idaho 1985). See generally
Scott W. Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine in Idaho, 19 ENVrL. L. 655 (1989).
114. Idaho Conservation League v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995).
115. Id. (quoting Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc., 671 P.2d at 1094). Rather than
explaining how the water rights were impressed with the public trust, the court merely
cited an earlier Idaho Supreme Court decision holding that "[t]he State of Idaho
holds title to the beds of all navigable bodies of water below the natural high water
mark for the use and benefit of the public." Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc., 671 P.2d at
1088.
116. The Idaho Legislature has since deprived the court's holdings of any weight.
In 1996 the Idaho Legislature passed a law that abrogated the state's public trust
obligations. See H.B. 794, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 1147
(codified at IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201 to -1203 (Michie 2000). The Idaho legislation is
discussed supra Part II.D.
117. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999).
118. Id. The court reached this conclusion after declaring that the "public trust
doctrine is a constitutional limitation on legislative power to give away resources held
by the state in trust for its people." Id. Accordingly, the court held that the legislature
could not "by legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its authority." Id.
119. Id. The court's opinion and its potential effects for western states are discussed
infra Parts IV &V.
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For many appropriators, Mono Lake, United Plainsmen Ass'n, Idaho
Conservation League, and most recently, San Carlos Apache Tribe, signal
an alarming trend in contemporary water law that prior appropriation
rights must not only coexist with the public rights to the water
resource, but are in many respects subordinate to them. Current users
are aware that if this trend continues, public trust doctrine successes
invariably will lead to the displacement of some prior appropriation
rights. Consequently, as with reserved rights, a tension has developed
between private water right holders, who have invested time, money,
and energy to put water to beneficial uses, and public interest groups,
public trust obligations by managing
who are asking states to honor
121
the water as a public resource.
D. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: LITIGATION, SETTLEMENT, AND
LEGISLATION

For over a century, irrigators, miners, and other extractive
industries have viewed water rights acquired under the prior
appropriation doctrine as property rights, incapable of being lost
except through abandonment or forfeiture. However, as noted above,
recent judicial opinions have declared prior appropriation rights
subordinate to senior reserved rights, indicating that prior
appropriators must relinquish rights to use the water if their use
conflicts with public trust obligations. As a result, most western states
today face the difficult task of reapportioning water and addressing
tensions created when the users in possession of the water are not
necessarily the ones with better title.
Using the jurisdiction granted to them by the McCarran
Amendment, some states have chosen to let parties resolve competing
claims by seeking re-apportionment in the courthouse. By 1980, seven
western states had initiated at least one general streamwide
for
122
These adjudications have had mixed success
adjudication. 1"
While
current water users attempting to maintain existing uses.
adjudications promise to secure rights, resolve reserved rights claims,
and provide better management of water,123 they have proved to be
120. Aside from identifying reserved rights as a source of tension, the Western States
Water Council indicated that competition by various public interests for scarce water
resources already appropriated to off-stream water developments also has led to
tension and dispute among water users. See WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, supra
note 64, at 24.
121. See CRAMMOND, supra note 6, at 24.
122. See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finality in General Water Rights
Adjudications, 25 IDAHO L.R. 271, 273 (1988-1989) (stressing that water right
adjudications rest upon a myth of certainty and finality).
123. Another advantage of adjudications for appropriators involves courts'
reluctance to allow public trust claimants to participate in the adjudications. See Idaho
Conservation League v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 749-50 (Idaho 1995). This reluctance
has given appropriators the luxury of postponing any potential conflicts their rights
may have under the public trust doctrine. The wisdom in postponing such litigation,
however, remains questionable. While appropriators may benefit from prolonged use
of the water resource, deferring adjudication of public trust issues allows appropriators
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quite lengthy and costly to claimants. 24 Adjudications have done
nothing to protect current water users who hold claims junior to
federal and tribal reserved rights. 21 Consequently, those states that
favor the status quo 2 6 have become increasingly disenchanted by the
litigation option and have sought to resolve the conflict either through
settlement or protective legislation.
Instead of litigation, some states have implemented successful
settlements between existing users and competing claimants. Tribes
and states have entered into at least fifteen congressionally ratified
settlements since 1982, 27' including the recent settlement with the
Chippewa Cree Tribe in Montana. 28
Advocates of negotiated
settlements argue that negotiations save time, trial expenses, and
emotional energy. ' 2 In addition, negotiations offer the parties more
flexible and creative solutions30 and can result in improved relations
between the federal government, tribes, and states.13 ' Negotiations are
to believe, falsely, that a general streamwide adjudication secures their rights against
any competing claimants. Because adjudications are meant to be "comprehensive"
and end with "final decrees," appropriators are likely to assume that their adjudicated
rights are indefeasibly vested. The myth of an indefeasibly vested prior appropriation
right, however, is precisely what led to the conflict between current users and reserved
right claimants. See discussion supra Part II.B. Postponing resolution of appropriator
claims with public trust doctrine principles will lead to the upset of economic and
emotional expectations as appropriators come to rely upon their adjudicated rights as
indefeasibly vested rights-when all along they are subject to the public trust. This
result could be lessened if courts allowed public trust claimants to participate in the
current adjudications.
124. SeeCRAMMOND, supra note 6, at 31-35.
125. See, e.g., In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 100-01 (Wyo. 1988) (using the PIA method, the court found
the Wind River tribes entitled to many thousand acre-feet of water that previously had
been used by prior appropriators).
126. Many western states have tailored their policies to preserve the status quo. See
Reed D. Benson, Maintainingthe Status Quo: ProtectingEstablishedWater Uses in the Pacific
Northwest, Despite the Rules of PriorAppropriation, 28 ENVTL. L. 881, 888 (1998) (noting
that western state legislatures, courts, and water resource agencies have routinely
changed the rules or refused to implement them if doing so might curtail current
uses).
127. See
PENDING

NATIONAL INDIAN WATER RIGHTS PROJECT, AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT AND
INDIAN
WATER
RIGHTS
SETTLEMENTS
at

http://www.cahe.wsu.edu/-chehalis/water.htm.
128. See President Clinton Signs into Law Administration's First Indian Water Rights
Settlement, U.S. NEWSWiRE, Dec. 10, 1999, at 1999 WL 22284298.
129. See, e.g., Susan D. Brienza, Wet Water vs. Paper Rights: Indian and Non-Indian
Negotiated Settlements and Their Effects, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 151, 168-69 (1992);
NATIONAL INDIAN WATER RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 128.
130. For example, prior settlements have set up tribal development trust funds and
equitable apportionment or multi-party cost sharing systems to assist tribes with
development of their reserved rights, while allowing some current users the ability to
continue with their diversions. See NATIONAL INDIAN WATER RIGHTS PROJET, supra note
128.
131. Id. The National Indian Water Rights Project ("Project") identified the
following benefits from negotiated settlements:
1. States can protect their citizens who have relied on state prior
appropriation systems while acquiring additional water supplies by covering
themselves under the "Indian blanket'; [sic]
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not without drawbacks, however. As one commentator noted, " [ y]ears
of distrust do not dissolve when parties opt to negotiate rather than
Negotiation by its nature requires compromise. Given
litigate.3
conflicting philosophies and years of rivalry among state, tribal, and
federal interests, the parties may not be willing to move from their
Therefore, negotiation may not be a practical
respective positions.
option for some states.
Instead of pursuing litigation or settlement options to resolve
conflicts between reserved rights and public trust pressures,
appropriators in at least two states have sought to avoid the conflict
altogether by obtaining protective legislation from their state
legislatures. In 1995, the Arizona Legislature was the first legislature to
respond to the demands of prior appropriators to protect their current
uses from reserved rights and public trust claims. 3 One year later, the
Idaho Legislature passed similar legislation prohibiting courts from35
applying public trust doctrine principles in water right adjudications.1
The validity of the Idaho legislation is questionable, and whether the
statute will survive judicial scrutiny remains uncertain. 136 In 1999,
2. The federal government can fulfill its trust obligation to tribes without
compromising its obligations to clean water, endangered species and other
federal reserves, and;
3. Tribes can now turn what was litigated "paper" Winters rights into "wet'
Winters rights which often can be marketed to enhance economic
development and self-sufficiency.
Id.
Most importantly, however, the Project notes, "all parties involved can avoid costly and
divisive litigation while having the experience of working together to resolve a
common dilemma." Id.
132. Gina McGovern, Settlement or Adjudication: Resolving Indian Reserved Rights, 36
ARIz. L. REv. 195, 214 (1994).
133. See Gover, Stetson & Williams, P.C., Tribal-StateDispute Resolution: Recent Attempts,
36 S.D. L. REv. 277, 277 (1990-1991) (noting that in light of the animosity, "it is
unreasonable to expect negotiations always to be fruitful. The wonder, to paraphrase
a well-known adage, is that they occur at all").
134. H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 17; H.B. 2193, 42d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1751.
135. H.B. 794, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 1147 (codified at
IDAHO CODE § 58-1201 to -1203 (Michie 2000)). The Idaho Legislature passed House
Bill 794 "to clarify the application of the public trust doctrine in the state of Idaho and
to expressly declare [its] limits." IDAHO CODE § 58-1201(6) (Michie 2000). The stated
intent behind the legislation was to clarify the confusion the doctrine had created in
the administration and management of state waters and school trust lands. Id. § 581201(4)-(5). The central provision of the legislation stated that Idaho's public trust
doctrine "is solely a limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the
title to the beds of navigable waters." Id. § 58-1203(1). The legislation expressly
prohibited any application of the doctrine to: (1) the management or disposition of
state trust lands; (2) the appropriation or use of water, or the granting, transfer,
administration, or adjudication of water or water rights, and (3) the protection or
exercise of private property rights. Id. § 58-1203(2) (a)-(c). Therefore, with this single
act, the Idaho Legislature effectively abated any tension between prior appropriators
and the public trust doctrine simply by relieving the state of its public trust obligations.
136. See Blumm et al., supra note 110, at 478-79 (arguing the legislation is invalid
because the Idaho Legislature erroneously assumed that the public trust doctrine is a
common law doctrine that a legislature can modify freely). See alsoJames M. Kearney,
Closingthe Floodgates? Idaho's Statutory Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine,34 IDAHO L.
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several Arizona tribes and the federal government successfully
challenged the Arizona legislation on various constitutional grounds.'
The discussion that follows explores the Arizona legislation and its
potential effects, reviews the supreme court case that held the statute
invalid, and attempts to identify what implications this case will have in
other western states.
III. ADOPTION AND EFFECT OF HOUSE BILLS 2276 AND 2193
In 1995, the Arizona Legislature passed House Bills 2276 and
2193,138 with the stated intent to "clarify existing laws and adopt
changes that are equitable and fair to all parties .... provide long-term
security to all water rights holders within this state and.., streamline
the adjudication process and remove undue burdens of litigation from
the parties." 39 Although not explicitly stated, the legislature intended
to remove the cloud that reserved rights and public trust doctrines had
placed on prior appropriation rights. That intent is most clearly
demonstrated both by the legislature's method of enacting the
legislation and the substantive effects the legislation would have had
on public trust and reserved rights doctrines.
A. BACKGROUND OF HOUSE BILLS

2276 AND 2193

The roots of House Bills 2276 and 2193 stem directly from the
state's failure to actively manage water for reserved rights or public
trust considerations. In 1912, when Arizona became a state, an 1893
territorial water code governed water rights within the state. 4 ' The
territorial code completely lacked governmental oversight of water
appropriations.'
In 1919, the state legislature attempted to obtain
REV. 91, 122-23 (1997) (concluding that the statute was not a valid exercise of
legislative power because the doctrine is rooted in sovereignty, and thus cannot be
abrogated).
137. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 186 (Ariz. 1999).
138. H.B. 2276, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 17 (amending various portions of ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-101 to -272, and adding ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-258, 45-261 to 264); H.B. 2193, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1751 (amending various portions of ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-151 to -257, and adding ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-321.01). House
Bill 2276 was the lead bill that attempted to amend various portions of the Arizona
water code and general stream adjudication statutes as applied to water rights
perfected on private lands. See Arizona Senate Fact Sheet for H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., Ist Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 1995) (on file with author). House Bill 2193 was a companion bill which
applied to water rights on public lands. H.B. 2193, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1751. The
primary focus of House Bill 2193 was to establish private ownership in water rights that
were perfected on state and federal lands. Id. at 1751-55. However, because water
rights perfected on public lands were subject to adjudications, the legislature repeated
some of the provisions found in House Bill 2276 and House Bill 2193. Consequently,
for clarity the discussion here focuses on House Bill 2276, noting where appropriate
the companion provisions in House Bill 2193.
139. H.B. 2276, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 36 (Declaration of policy and intent).
140. Act No. 86, 17th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1893 Ariz. Sess. Laws 119.
141. See Senate, State of Arizona, Legislative History of House Bill 2276, 42d Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. 3 (Ariz. 1995) [hereinafter LegislativeHistory]. According to a memorandum
to the Arizona Department of Water Resources, the Salt River Project prepared the
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42
some control over water resources by enacting laws creating a water
right permitting process and a State Water Commission to oversee the
permits.' 3 The 1919 code, however, failed to specify whether the new
permitting process was to be the exclusive means for acquiring water
rights. " ' Consequently, appropriators continued to obtain rights
under the territorial code without having to give the state notice of
their rights through filing a water right application.'4 5
Without adequate records, the state was unable to manage the
diversions. By the 1940s, many of Arizona's streams had become fully
appropriated.1 4 6 The situation was aggravated in the 1960s, when
several Arizona tribes, following the Supreme Court's decision in
Arizona v. California,4 7 began asserting water rights with priority dates
superior to most appropriators. 48 In 1968, the Salt River Project, one
of Arizona's largest water users, attempted to settle some of the tribal
claims to the Salt River. 149 Those negotiations failed, however, when
50
the parties could not agree on the extent of the tribes' water rights.'
In light of the failed negotiations, in 1974, the Salt River Project
filed a petition with the Arizona Land Department ("Land
Department") requesting an adjudication of all claims to the Upper
Salt River.' 5' Over the next two years, other large non-Indian water
users filed additional petitions requesting adjudication of the Upper
Gila, San Pedro, and Little Colorado River watersheds. 52 Collectively,
these adjudications
53 accounted for almost all of the available surface
water in Arizona.
In 1979, the Land Department advised 12,000 potential claimants,
including the United States federal government and various Arizona

Legislative History and Senator Jim Buster submitted it into the record. Memorandum
from Jim Johnson, to Mike Pearce, Ariz. Dep't of Water Res. (Mar. 8, 1995) (on file
with author).
142. H.B. 126, 4th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1919 Ariz. Sess. Laws 278.
143. Legislative Histoy, supra note 141, at 3.
144. Id. Because the code did not specify whether the permit process was
mandatory, appropriators could continue appropriating water rights under the pre1919 method of simply diverting water and putting it to a beneficial use. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 4.
147. Arizonav. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
148. Legislative Histoy, supra note 141, at 4.
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id.
151. Id.
at
OVERVIEW,
RIGHTS-ARIZONA
152. WATER
http://supreme.state.az.us/wm/overview.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2000). In 1976, the
Salt River Project filed a second petition for the Verde River and its tributaries. Id.
On February 17 and April 19, 1978, the Phelps Dodge Corporation filed petitions to
determine water rights of the Gila River and Little Colorado watersheds. Id. On April
3, 1978, ASARCO, Inc. filed a petition for the adjudication of the San Pedro River and
its tributaries. Id.
BACKGROUND,
RIGHTS-ARIZONA
WATER
generally
153. See
http://supreme.state.az.us/wm/background.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2000).

at
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tribes, of the pending adjudications '54 Shortly thereafter, the Arizona
Legislature enacted a statute'5 5 that transferred jurisdiction over
surface water adjudications from the Land Department to the superior
court. 56 Fearing unfair treatment by the state, in March and April
1979, the tribes filed a series of lawsuits in United States District Court
challenging the state's jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment
57
and seeking determination of their reserved rights by a federal court.
These suits ultimately resulted in decisions by the Supreme Court in
1983,"' and the Arizona Supreme Court in 1985,' upholding the
state's power to adjudicate tribal reserved rights claims.
The adjudications next turned to the difficult issue of deciding
priorities among prior appropriation and federal water right claims.
To initiate the process, the state courts asked the tribes and United
States government to state the legal nature and extent of their

154. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 557-58 (1983)
[hereinafter San Carlos 1]. The state notified the Navajo Nation, San Carlos Apache
Tribe, Yavapai-Apache Tribe, and Mohave-Apache Tribe. See generally United States v.
Superior Court, 697 P.2d 658, 663-64 (Ariz. 1985) [hereinafter San Carlos I].
155. SeeARjz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-252 (West 1999).
156. The Salt River, Verde River, and Gila River adjudications were transferred to
the Maricopa County Superior Court, and the San Pedro River adjudication was
transferred to the Cochise County Superior Court. See WATER RIGHTS-ARIZONA
OVERVIEW, supra note 152.
In November 1981, the Arizona Supreme Court
consolidated these adjudications into one proceeding and assigned the case to the
Maricopa County Superior Court under the caption In re the General Adjudication of
All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source, Nos. W-1, W-2, W-3 & W-4
(Consolidated). Id. The Little Colorado River adjudication, which was transferred to
the Apache County Superior Court, remained there where it has since been litigated
under the caption In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the
Little Colorado River System and Source, No. 6417. Id.
The legislature's intent in making this change is unclear. One possible
explanation for the change was the fear of losing McCarran Amendment jurisdiction
over the federal parties if the adjudication remained under the jurisdiction of a state
agency. Indeed, in 1994, the issue of whether the states would lose McCarran
Amendment jurisdiction if adjudications were performed by state administrative
agencies was argued before the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 943 (1995). In Oregon, the court held that states
could have administrative agencies perform adjudications without forfeiting
jurisdiction over the federal parties so long as the courts retained ultimate review over
the agencies' decisions. Id. at 765-67.
157. See San CarlosI, 463 U.S. at 558.
158. Id. at 564. The tribe's challenge came as a surprise to the state claimants. The
Supreme Court previously held that the waiver of federal immunity in the McCarran
Amendment included tribal reserved rights held in trust by the federal government.
See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 809-12 (1976).
The issue in San Carlos I, however, was whether the McCarran Amendment was
overridden by the Arizona Enabling Act and Constitution, which expressly precluded
the state from deciding issues of Indian title. San Carlos 1, 463 U.S. at 558-59. The
Court held that the McCarran Amendment dismantled any bar created by federal
policy or the enabling acts. Id. at 564. However, the Court left the question of
whether the language of the state constitution precluded state courtjurisdiction to the
Arizona courts to decide. Id. at 564 n.15.
159. San Carlos II, 697 P.2d at 670 (holding that the state constitution did not
prevent state courts from adjudicating tribal claims because the adjudications
pertained only to the priority of water rights, not their validity).
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reserved rights claims.'o
However, once the tribes and federal
government had done so, the current water users, who feared the risk
of losing to senior federal and tribal claims, sought political relief in
the Arizona Legislature."'
On February 25, 1994, the Arizona Legislature created a Joint
Select Committee on the Arizona General Stream Adjudications
("Committee") to hear testimony on the problems with the
adjudication process and to draft legislation addressing those
problems. 62
The Committee, however, failed to produce any
legislation.'
Instead, as the Committee heard testimony from the
federal government, tribes, and current water users,64 representatives
from the largest water users in the state were busy drafting language
that eventually would be included in House Bills 2276 and 2193. 65
Although the Committee discussed many issues ultimately affected by
the legislation,' and had received proposed language, the legislation

160. See Opening Brief of the Navajo Nation et al. at 18 & n.5, San Carlos Apache
Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999) (No. CV-95-0161-SA) (outlining the
Little Colorado River Adjudication developments following San Carlos 11) (on file with
author).
161. Id. at 9.
162. Letter from Mark W. Killian, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives,
and Pat Wright, President Pro Tern. of the Arizona Senate, to Arizona Senator Jim
Buster 1 (Feb. 25, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter CreatingJoint Select
Committee]. The legislature directed the Committee to: (1) estimate the public and
private resources which have been expended in the adjudication process; (2)
determine what changes can be made to the adjudication statutes to expedite the
adjudications; (3) determine what changes should be made to surface and
groundwater codes so as to reduce the amount of litigation necessary to adjudicate
water rights; and (4) to report back to the legislature with their findings. Id.
163. Apache Petitioners' Opening Brief at 17, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior
Court, 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999) (No. CV-95-0161-SA).
164. The.Committee held numerous meetings between February 25 and November
22, 1994. See generally Joint Select Committee on Arizona General Stream
Adjudications, Minutes of Meeting 1-3 (Nov. 22, 1994) (on file with author, minutes and
tapes also on file with the Secretary of the Arizona Senate) [hereinafter 11/22/94
Minutes]., Most of these meetings were dominated by existing water users with
proposals for addressing the possible loss of their water rights to reserved rights and
public trust doctrine considerations. See, e.g., id.
165. The parties who drafted the legislation were the State Department of Water
Resources ("DWR"), the Salt River Project, Phelps Dodge Corporation, and various
municipalities. Apache Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 163, at 17 (noting that
of the more than fifteen lawyers on the ad hoc drafting committee, not one
represented tribal, federal, or public interests).
166. During the hearings, current water users made several proposals to the
Committee. Some of the proposals included: creating a de minimis water user
exception to the general streamwide adjudications, lessening the burden of proof
needed to substantiate a water right claim in an adjudication, establishing
standardized methods for quantifying water rights, enacting various procedural
amendments that gave current water users stronger claims, abolishing any public trust
values that may be inherent in water right adjudications, relaxing current change of
use and change in point of diversion requirements, and relaxing current forfeiture
statutes. See Joint Select Committee on Arizona General Stream Adjudications,
Arizona Department of Water Resources, Analysis of Proposals:State Water Code Issues 614 (1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Analysis of Proposals: State Water Code
Issues].
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that the major water users drafted was never publicly circulated at the
Committee meetings. 6 7
Although the drafts prepared by the current water users had not
been discussed openly at Committee meetings, seven members of the
Committee, among others, introduced the draft legislation in the
Arizona Legislature on January 16, 1995.9 During the various public
hearings on the bills, the legislature was informed that the bills needed
more public scrutiny, 70 were developed without the tribes' or federal
government's partipaton,' would produce more delay in the
adjudication process, and were likely unconstitutional . Despite
these concerns, the legislature enacted the bills and the governor
approved House Bill 2276 on March 17, 1995, and House Bill 2193 on
April 19, 1995.' While the Arizona Legislature passed the bills in the
form of statutes, they more closely resembled a legislative water right
adjudication.
B. THE LEGISLATION'S EFFECT ON RESERVED RIGHTS

Although the process by which the legislature drafted and enacted

167. See Apache Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 163, at 17 (noting that
numerous drafts were labeled "Not for Distribution").
168. Although a draft of the legislation was never publicly circulated, during the
Committee's final meeting, Steve Olson, Legislative Liaison from the DWR, presented
a "concept-paper" which essentially summarized the main provisions of the draft bill.
See 11/22/94 Minutes, supra note 164, at 1.
169. This number was compiled by comparing the list of Committee members to the
list of sponsors for House Bill 2276. Compare Letter CreatingJoint Select Committee,
at 1, with House Bill 2276 Status Overview, at
162,
supra note
http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/42leg/Ir/bills/hb2276o.htm (last visited Nov.
11,2000).
170. During the public hearing on House Bill 2276 in the Senate Committee on
Natural Resources, Agriculture & Environment, a concerned citizen suggested that the
bill had not been given the full public debate that these issues deserved. Surface Water
Code Amendments: 2/22/95 Hearing on H.B. 2276 Before the Senate Comm. on Natural Res.,
Agric. & Env't, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 3 (Ariz. 1995) (statement of Donald Steuter)
(on file with author). In response, Senator Jim Buster dismissed Steuter's comments
by remarking that the Committee, which he co-chaired, met numerous times during
the interim, providing plenty of opportunity for public debate. Id.
171. Representatives from the United States Forest Service, Bureau of Land
Management, Arizona Audubon Society, and Sierra Club all spoke against House Bill
2276, raising concerns about the bill's effects upon federal lands and questioning
whether the tribes were given the opportunity to participate in the bill's formation. Id.
at 3-5.
172. During the public hearing on House Bill 2276 in the House Committee on
Natural Resources & Agriculture, Joe Sparks, an attorney representing the San Carlos
Apache Tribes, claimed that the bill would not streamline the adjudication process,
but instead produce more delay. Surface Water Code Amendments: 1/31/95 Hearing on
H.B. 2276 Before the House Comm. on Natural Res. & Agric., 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. 10
(Ariz. 1995) (statement of Joe Sparks) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1/31/95
HearingBefore the House].
173. Sparks also testified that, in his opinion, the bill threatened to violate the Equal
Protection Clauses of both the Arizona and United States Constitutions. Id.
174. See H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., IstReg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 37; H.B. 2193, 42d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1755.
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the bills showed disregard for tribal, federal, and public water claims,
the terms of the legislation best reveal the legislature's intent to
Rather than
preserve prior appropriators' current water uses.
streamlining adjudications, clarifying existing laws, or adopting
changes that were fair and equitable to all parties,' the bills attempted
to disadvantage reserved rights claims by: (1) making a series of
"procedural" amendments to the water code which would have
resuscitated older water right claims, thereby elevating the priority of
existing water users; (2) granting existing "de minimis" water users an
exemption from the adjudication process; (3) creating three new
statutory presumptions that secured large quantities of water for prior
appropriation claimants remaining in the adjudication; and (4)
retroactively altering prior reserved rights settlements to give the use
of the water subject to the settlement back to appropriators.
1. The "Procedural" Amendments
Under the guise of streamlining the adjudication process, the
amendments to the state water
legislature made several "procedural
code. These amendments, however, did more than modify procedural
rules. They substantively altered the code to preserve claims that
otherwise would be dismissed, and elevated the priority of some
current users'77 by resuscitating older water rights that had otherwise
been abandoned or forfeited,' and allowing current users to adversely
possess water rights with older priorities.

175. Section 25(A) of H.B. 2276 states, in part:
The legislature finds and declares that the interests of the citizens of this state
will be best served if the statutorily created process for the adjudication of
surface water rights is amended to simplify and expedite pending litigation.
The legislature also finds that ambiguities exist in the current statutes
relating to surface water rights and that the clarification of these statutes will
assist all parties by reducing the 'need for the courts to resolve current
ambiguities. The legislature recognizes that the general stream adjudications
are complicated and have the potential to profoundly affect the property
rights of the water users of this state. It is the intention of this act to clarify existing
laws and adopt changes that are equitableand fair to all parties, that comply with the
letter and the spirit of the McCarran Amendment (43 United States Code section 666),
that provide long-term security to all water rights holders within this state and that
streamline the adjudicationprocess and remove undue burdens of litigationfrom the
parties.
H.B. 2276, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 36 (emphasis added).
176. The legislature classified the amendments as procedural to avoid any legal
challenge. Under Arizona and federal constitutional law, legislation that is merely
procedural may be applied retroactively. See Hall v. A.N.R. Freight Sys., Inc., 717 P.2d
434, 443 & n.14 (Ariz. 1986). A statute may not alter substantive legal rights that were
secured before the legislation's enactment. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 269-71 (1994).
177. The Arizona Legislature was careful to avoid directly altering reserved rights.
Rather than altering reserved rights to affirmatively take water away from the tribes or
the federal government, the legislature crafted the bills in a way that strengthened the
claims of prior appropriators. One of the ways the legislature strengthened
appropriators' claims was to provide "procedural" avenues that led to more senior
positions than what reserved rights could claim.
178. The abandonment and forfeiture rules are discussed supraPart II.A.
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Section 3 of House Bill 2276, for example, prohibited a court from
declaring a water right forfeiture or abandonment when appropriators
had used the water on only a part of the land to which the right was
appurtenant. 179
This provision, later invalidated by the Arizona
Supreme Court, could have enabled appropriators to retain rights they
had not perfected, thus creating a new protection against a judicial
finding of abandonment that did not exist in the former water code.
The same section of House Bill 2276 would have allowed appropriators
to claim water rights with very senior priority dates by prohibiting a
court from applying forfeiture rules to appropriators with rights
claimed prior to June 12, 1919,80 the date of Arizona's first surface
water code.'' In addition, section 5 of the bill stated that failure to
obtain approval for a change in use from the state would not result in
abandonment or forfeiture, or loss of priority."' Section 14 also
increased the opportunity for appropriators to regain lost rights with
potentially senior priority dates to reserved rihts claims by providing
for five new exceptions to the forfeiture rules.
House Bill 2276 also carved out new ways for appropriators to
establish older priorities to their current use of water. Section 12 of
the bill recognized an appropriator's ability to acquire water rights
through adverse possession until May 21, 1974,84 the date the Arizona
Legislature enacted the Water Rights Registration Act, which required
all persons using or claiming the right to use the waters of the state to
file a statement of claim for each water right by June 30, 1979.185 The
prior version of the code recognized adverse possession until 1919
only.8" Therefore, the new provision would have allowed claimants to

179. H.B. 2276, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 18 (codified as amended at ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-141B (West 1999). That section of the Arizona legislation should be
contrasted to the situation where the appropriator continues to irrigate the entire
parcel, but uses less water to do so. Some states make an exception to the forfeiture
rule in this situation to encourage water conservation. See, e.g.,
CAL. WATER CODE §
1011 (West 2000). Whether such legislation is valid or wise remains questionable. See
Krista Koehl, PartialForfeitureof Water Rights: Oregon Compromises TraditionalPrinciplesto
Achieve Flexibility, 28 ENvrL. L. 1137, 1161-62 (1998).
180. H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 18 (codified as
amended at ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-141C (West 1999)).
181. H.B. 126, 4th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1919 Ariz. Sess. Laws 278.
182. H.B. 2276, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 19-20 (codified as amended at ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-156E (West 1999)).
183. Id. at 24-25 (codified as amended at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-189E (West
1999)) (stating that a prior appropriator could avoid a forfeiture if the appropriator
(1) had not used the water due to reconstruction; (2) had entered into an agreement
with the United States to leave the water in stream for wildlife purposes; (3) had only
used the water on part of his land to which the right was appurtenant; (4) had entered
into an agreement with an operator of a reservoir to leave his portion of the water in
storage; and (5) had entered into an agreement with another appropriator to forbear
withdrawals).
184. Id. at 23 (codified as amended at ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-187 (West 1999)).
185. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-182 (West 1994) (amended 1995).
186. See id. § 45-187 ("No rights to use of public waters of the state may be acquired
by adverse use or adverse possession as between the person and the state, or as
between one or more persons asserting the water right; but nothing contained herein
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make adverse possession claims from 1919 to 1974. This provision
could have harmed reserved rights claimants by allowing current water
with priority dates
users to claim adverse possession of water rights
7
senior to the creation of the federal reservation.1
2. The De Minimis Exception
Although the "procedural" amendments preserved prior
appropriation claims that otherwise would have been dismissed, and
allowed some appropriators to claim more senior water rights, they
would not have completely protected all current users from being
displaced by reserved right claimants with senior priority dates. To
protect some other users, section 21 of House Bill 2276 exempted
certain statutorily defined de minimis uses18 from the regular
adjudications.18 9 The legislation required the courts to give a summary
decree granting current users the right to continue their de minimis
uses without adjudication. 9 Testimony at the Committee hearings
indicated that these exceptions would account for a total of
approximately 47,000 acre-feet of water.1 ' The Arizona Supreme
Court remarked that these exceptions constituted approximately twothirds to four-fifths of the total state water right claims.
The statute did provide that parties who claimed rights senior to
these de minimis users, like the tribes and federal government, could
challenge the summary decree.'93 However, this remedy would have
been of little value to the tribes or federal government because the
statute allowed objections only in post-adjudication enforcement
actions, or if the appropriator applied to the state to transfer water
rights to another location.' In addition, even when a challenge was
brought, the legislation aided current water users by shifting the
burden of proof to the objecting party to show that the de minimis use
would have been available to satisfy its rights, 9' a burden similar in

shall be deemed to diminish or enhance the validity of a claim filed under this article
originating prior to the effective date of chapter 164 of the Laws of 1919.") (amended
1995).
187. See Sears v. Berryman, 623 P.2d 455, 460 (Idaho 1981) (holding an adverse
possessor retains the same priority date as that enjoyed by the dispossessed party).
188. H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 32-34 (codified as
amended at ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-258 (West 1999)). Section 21 allowed
stockpond owners with a capacity of fifteen acre-feet or less, domestic users of three
acre-feet or less, small business users of three acre-feet or less, and stock watering uses
of one acre-foot or less an exemption from the regular adjudication proceedings. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 1/31/95 HearingBefore the House, supra note 172, at 34 (statement of Joe Sparks,
attorney for San Carlos Apache Tribes).
192. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 195 (Ariz. 1999).
193. H.B. 2276, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 34 (codified as amended at ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 45-258F (West 1999)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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form and in difficulty to the futile call doctrine.

3. The Maximum Use Presumptions
To maximize the amount of water current users could obtain
under the de minimis exemption, or in the regular adjudication, the
Arizona Legislature created statutory presumptions that could have
entitled prior appropriators to amounts of water in excess of their
actual rights."' Section 19 of House Bill 2276 created the first
presumption, known as "on-farm water duties."'" Under section 19,
the Department of Water Resources ("DWR") was required to
determine the quantities of water needed for growing particular crops
at various elevations.1 99 The statute required a court to incorporate the
state's estimates into any decree unless a contestant in the proceeding
could show, by a preponderance of evidence, actual use less than the
presumed amount. 20 0 Due to the difficulty of satisfying this burden of

proof, the presumption likely would have resulted in the courts
decreeing large quantities of water for existing users who used the
water to grow crops.
The second presumption required courts to determine an
appropriator's quantity of water based on the maximum theoretical
capacity of the diversion or storage facility. 20 1 As with the on-farm
water duty presumption, the opposing party had the burden of
showing the presumed amount was more than the appropriator's
actual usage, 0 Because the appropriator was the only party with good
information regarding actual use, the maximum capacity presumption
likely would have secured large quantities of water in excess of actual
use for several appropriators.

196. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 195. The futile call doctrine holds that a
senior appropriator may prevent ajunior appropriator from diverting water only when
doing so will be of some benefit to the senior. See discussion supra note 37. While the
goal of the doctrine is to maximize use of water, the burden on the senior user can be
difficult to meet. As Professor Harrison C. Dunning noted:
In practice, tremendous uncertainty often exists as to just how upstream use
affects the downstream availability of water. Decisions may turn on computer
modeling more than anything else in many situations...
In such
circumstances some of the assumptions made by the computer modelers are
bound to prove inaccurate and some seniors are likely to be injured. When
this happens, it is unlikely anyone will try to put Humpty-Dumpty together
again and restore to the injured seniors their original priority.
Dunning, supra note 39, at 477.
197. H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 29-30 (codified as
amended at ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-256 (West 1999)).
198. Id. at 29 (codified as amended at ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-256A(6) (West
1999)). A duty, often measured in acre-feet, is the total amount of water to which a
right holder is entitled.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 29 (codified as amended at ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-256A(6) (West
1999)).
201. Id. at 30 (codified as amended at ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-256A(7) (West
1999)).
202. Id.
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The third statutory presumption created by House Bill 2276 was
known as "the prior filing presumption rule.", 3 This presumption
required a court to accept information presented by the claimants in
prior filins as true unless DWR found the information clearly
The legislation required a court to resolve any
erroneous.
20 5
If a
conflicting information in the filings in favor of the claimant.
party to the adjudication disagreed with the facts stated in the filing, it
had the burden of proving the facts contained in the prior filing were
incorrect by clear and convincing evidence.20 6 Again, like the
maximum capacity standard, the opposing party was unlikely to be
successful in challenging the presumption because the party making
the filing was the one with the information necessary to prove whether
the filing was correct. Therefore, this presumption virtually allowed
appropriators carte blanche authority to determine the quantity of their
rights.
4. Reserved Rights Settlements
As noted above, many western states have attempted to resolve
disputes between prior appropriators and reserved rights claimants
through settlement agreements. 207 Prior to the enactment of House
Bill 2276, Arizona had entered into approximately five settlement
agreements with American Indian tribes. 2' Although the settlements
indicated that the tribes had a senior right to the water, they seldom
resulted in an actual transfer of water to the tribes. Because the tribes
often lacked the means to develop the water, the tribes frequently
agreed to lease the water back to the appropriator who had been using
the water previousy.200 House Bill 2276 proposed a new section to the
Arizona Water Code that altered the terms of these agreements.210

203. H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 34-35 (codified as
amended at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-261 (West 1999)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 34 (codified as amended at ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-261A(4) (West
1999)).
206. Id. (codified as amended at Aviz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-261B (West 1999)).
207. See supranotes 127-34 and accompanying text.
208. See Joint Select Legislative Committee on Arizona General Stream
Adjudications, Arizona Department of Water Resources, Analysis of Proposals:Status of
Indian Water Rights Settlements 16-19 (1994) (indicating by 1994 the state had entered
into settlements with the Ak Chin Indian Community, Fort McDowell Indian
Community, Tohono O'Odham Nation, Salt River-Pima Maricopa Indian Community,
and the San Carlos Apache Tribe's claims to the Salt River) (on file with author).
209. See id. (indicating that in 1990 the Fort McDowell Indian Community had
agreed to lease 4,300 acre-feet of water to the city of Phoenix; in 1992, the Ak Chin
Indian Community leased unused portions of its water right settlement to the Central
Arizona Project; and in 1992, the San Carlos Apache Tribe entered into a one
hundred year lease with the City of Scottsdale for a portion of the tribe's Salt River
settlement).
210. H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 35 (codified as
amended at ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-262 (West 1999)). Section 21 of the bill stated:
Contributions of surface water by an appropriator to an Indian water rights
settlement shall not diminish the appropriator's decreed water right
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While the exact effect of the provision is uncertain, one possible
reading of the statute would have allowed appropriators to avoid their
lease payments to the tribe.
Section 21 of the bill provided, unless a settlement agreement
stated otherwise, prior appropriators who relinquished water under a
reserved rights settlement agreement would remain the decreed water
right holder,' thereby leaving paper title in the appropriators' hands.
Generally, courts presume paper title to any water in a water right
settlement would have transferred to the tribe. However, section 21
reversed that presumption. Because the Arizona tribes had entered
into five reserved rights settlements without the benefit of this
language, none of the settlements expressly stated that appropriators
who contributed water to the settlement severed their interest in the
water.212 Therefore, under this new presumption, many appropriators
who participated in former settlements would have regained paper
title to water they contributed to any tribal reserved rights settlement.
The statute did not merely re-vest prior appropriators with paper
title; it also conferred special use privileges upon them. Section 21
provided that the "decreed right holder" (appropriator) had the right
to use any water not actually being used by the tribe.213 Although the
legislation did not define "actual use," interpreted literally, it would
have allowed an appropriator to argue the tribes were not "actually
using" the water because they had leased the water back to the state
claimants. Accordingly, the statute gave the appropriator a right to
continued use of the water without needing to compensate the tribe,
until the tribe could actually use the water.
C. THE LEGISLATION'S EFFECT ON THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Prior to the legislature's enactment of House Bill 2276, the public
trust doctrine had not received much attention from the Arizona
courts. No reported decisions applied the doctrine to water rights.1 4
pursuant to section 45-257 unless a severance and transfer of that right are
specifically provided for in the settlement agreement, but the appropriator
shall not use water available under its decreed right if the water is actually
being used by an Indian tribe pursuant to the settlement agreement. The
decree entered for the appropriator shall include any contributions that are
made and that are designated as for the benefit of the tribe, subject to the
provisions of the settlement agreement.
Id. (emphasis added).
211. Id.
212. Indeed, the language in most reserved rights settlements stated it was the tribes,
not the existing users, who agree to sever and transfer their rights to current users in
exchange for the state's promise to deliver absolute quantities of water to the
reservation. See BURTON, supra note 1, at 80-81 (discussing the Ak Chin, Tohono
O'Odham, and Salt River Maricopa settlements).
213. H.B. 2276, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 35 (codified as amended at ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 45-262 (West 1999)).
214. Until San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, the Arizona courts had only
applied the public trust doctrine to the management of river beds. See Tracey
Dickman Zobenica, The Public Trust Doctrine in Arizona's Streambeds, 38 ARIz. L. REV.
1053, 1059-63 (1996) (describing the evolution of the public trust doctrine in
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However, the legislative history of House Bill 2276 indicated that the
legislature was concerned the Arizona courts might adopt the
California Supreme Court's Mono Lake decision. 5 To ensure the
Arizona courts would not adopt the Mono Lake analysis, the legislature
added a section to House Bill 2276, prohibiting courts from taking the
public 1 6trust doctrine into consideration when adjudicating water
2

rights.

Section 21 unequivocally stated: "The public trust is not an
element of a water right... In adjudicating the attributes of water
rights pursuant to this article, the court shall not make a
determination as to whether public trust values are associated with any
or all of the river system or source." 217 Consequently, this section
would have effectively denied standing to public interest groups
wanting to assert public trust considerations in an adjudication.
Further, this section would have precluded the judiciary from
considering whether state-granted water rights fulfilled the state's
public trust obligations. 8
D. THE DANGERS IN LEGISLATIVE OVERREACHING
In sum, the provisions of House Bill 2276 would have significantly
hindered the ability of the federal government, tribes, and public to
Arizona).
215. See Memorandum from Arizona Senator Carol Springer, to Members of the
Joint Select Committee on Arizona General Stream Adjudications 6 (June 21, 1994)
(including notation of a letter by Jerry Haggard, representing Phelps Dodge Corp., to
the Committee in favor of placing a limit on the public trust doctrine. In that letter he
expressed concerns that "[d]ecisions indicate that the Public Trust Doctrine will be
considered in adjudicating private water rights. The Public Trust Doctrine of water
rights is an unprecedented concept, established in and presently limited to California,
that holds that public trust interest is imposed on every private water right which
allows private water rights to be taken and redistributed without compensation in
order to further social goals") (on file with author, minutes and tapes also on file with
the Secretary of the Arizona Senate); see also 11/22/94 Minutes, supra note 164, at 4
(remarks of Arizona State Representative Rusty Bowers that tying the public trust
doctrine to adjudications was not in state's interest); Analysis of Proposals: State Water
Code Issues, supra note 166, at 10-11 (describing general opposition to the theory that
the public trust doctrine applies to water rights).
216. H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 35 (codified as
amended at ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-263B (West 1999)).
217. Id.
218. Arguably, the provision did not completely shield water rights from the public
trust doctrine. Because the statute began by stating "in adjudicating the attributes of
water rights pursuant to this article," the legislation did appear to contemplate the
possibility that courts could consider public trust based challenges outside of a general
streamwide adjudication. Id. During the June meeting of the Committee, Senator
Carol Springer presented a memorandum which suggested incorporating the
following language into any bill the Committee might present to the legislature: "This
state does not recognize the public trust doctrine and that doctrine shall not apply in
any determination of water rights in this state." Memorandum from Arizona Senator
Carol Springer, supra note 215, at 7. Had this language ultimately been adopted, the
bill certainly would have precluded all public trust doctrine challenges, whether in a
general streamwide adjudication or not. The legislature's reasons for failing to adopt
Senator Springer's language are not clear from the record.
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obtain secure rights to Arizona's water resources. The "procedural"
provisions, de minimis exceptions, statutory presumptions and burdens
of proof, the reserved rights settlement provision, and the abolition of
the public trust doctrine promised to maintain the status quo for many
prior appropriators. Viewed collectively, the provisions of House Bill
2276 effectively would have kept many thousand acre-feet of water in
the hands of current water users. 219
House Bills 2276 and 2193 exemplify the type of legislative
overreaching that can develop when current water users, feeling the
pressures of the reserved rights and public trust doctrines, turn to
their representatives in the state legislature for help. Despite the
Arizona Legislature's classification of the bills as a procedural measure
designed to streamline and improve the general streamwide
adjudication process, House Bills 2276 and 2193 were actually special
interest legislation specifically designed to benefit one group at the
expense of others. Fortunately for the tribes, federal government, and
the public, the Arizona Supreme Court proved unwilling to allow a
majoritarian institution like the Arizona Legislature to alter
retroactively the vested legal rights of the underrepresented. Had the
case been decided otherwise, the future of property rights in Arizona's
resources would have been left to the uncertain whims of the political
majority.
IV. SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE V. SUPERIOR COURT
On March 17, 1995, the same day House Bill 2276 was signed into
law,"' various prior appropriators in the Little Colorado River
Adjudication filed a motion to declare the bills constitutional."'
Presiding Judge Minker declined the invitation.222 One month later,

219. Filings with the DWR reflect that unresolved tribal claims to water in the Gila
River Adjudication exceed 2.8 million acre-feet annually, while in the Little Colorado
Adjudication the Hopi and Navajo Indian tribes claim more than 380,000 acre-feet
annually. Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State
of Arizona at 7 n.5, Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. United States, No. 99-1389,
2000 U.S. LEXIS 4291, at *1, 120 S.Ct. 2705 (June 19, 2000). The surface water supply
of these streams, however, could not sustain these amounts. Id. The annual surface
water supply is approximately 1.3 million acre-feet in the Gila River basin and less than
180,000 acre-feet in the Little Colorado River basin. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
WATER SUPPLY PAPER 2300, NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY 1985-HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND
SURFACE-WATER RESOURCES 145-46 (1986).

220. See H.B. 2276, 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws 37.
221. Motion for Order Determining that 1995 Amendments to Arizona Statutes
Regarding Water Rights and General Stream Adjudications are Applicable to this
Proceeding, Do Not Deprive the Court of Jurisdiction, and are Constitutional, In Re
Gen. Adjudication of All Rights To Use Water in the Little Colo. River Sys. & Source,
(Ariz. Super. Ct. 1995) (No. 6417) (on file with author). The named parties who filed
the motion included the Arizona Public Service Company, Aztec Land and Cattle
Company, Ltd., Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District, Salt
River Valley Water Users' Association, and Silver Creek Irrigation District. Id.
222. In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Little Colo. River
Sys. & Source, No. 6417 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 1995) (order denying motion) (on
file with author).
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on April 17, 1995, the San Carlos Apache Tribe, Tonto Apache Tribe,
and Yavapai Apache Nation ("Apache Tribes") petitioned the Arizona
Supreme Court for special action," 3 challenging the constitutionality
of House Bill 2276. , The Arizona Supreme Court accepted the
petition, but in an unusual step, referred the challenge to Judge
Bolton, superior court judge assigned to the Gila River Adjudication,
to begin the case by first identifying any issues requiring immediate
resolution, taking testimony, and then independently determining
each constitutional issue. 5
A. THE SUPERIOR COURT PROCEEDINGS

At the trial court level, the Navajo Nation, Hopi Tribe, Pueblo of
Zuni, and San Juan Southern Paiute Tribe ("Navajo Tribes"), and the
United States joined the Apache Tribes (collectively, "Federal Parties")
in their claim challenging the legislation. 6 The Federal Parties
claimed that the legislation: (1) deprived the Federal Parties of due
process by retroactively altering vested rights; (2) violated separation
of powers and due process principles by resolving water right claims
outside of the adjudication process and without judicial oversight; (3)
denied the tribes equal protection under the state and federal
constitutions; and (4) violated the Contract Clause by interfering with
reserved right settlements. 2 2 7

The Federal Parties argued, in the

alternative, that if the statute was implemented it would place the
pending general stream adjudications outside the waiver of federal
22
sovereign immunity conferred by the McCarran Amendment.

8

The

Salt River Project, Cyprus Mining Entities, and Land Department
("State Parties") supported the legislation on the ground the statute
was merely procedural, and that to the extent the legislation made

223. The Arizona court rules allow parties to file a "special action" directly in the
state's supreme court for cases which require urgent disposition. See ARIz. CT. R. 1.
224. In re the Special Action Proceedings Initiated by the Apache Tribes, No. CV-95at
available
1996),
30,
Aug.
Ct.
Super.
(Ariz.
0161-SA
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/wm/bolton/gilabolt.htm [hereinafter Special Action
Proceedings]. At the same time, the Apache Tribes petitioned the Maricopa Superior
Court for a stay in the Gila River Adjudication pending the outcome of the challenge.
See Apache Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 163, at 1 n.2. The court approved
the stay on April 21, 1995. See id. The Apache Tribes later amended their complaint
to include a challenge to House Bill 2193. See id. at 3.
225. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 187 (Ariz. 1999).
226. Special Action Proceedings, supra note 224.
227. Id.
228. Id. In order for a state to avail itself of the waiver of federal sovereign
immunity, the McCarran Amendment requires that the federal claims be decided in a
comprehensive proceeding. See 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). The Federal Parties argued
that the de minimis provisions and abrogation of the public trust resulted in piece meal
litigation, thus destroying the comprehensiveness the Arizona general streamwide
adjudications and removing the proceedings from the jurisdictional grant of the
McCarran Amendment. Special Action Proceedings, supra note 224. For a general
discussion of the McCarran Amendment see 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note
9, § 37.04(a)(1), at 273-75.
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substantive changes, they were prospective only.2 '
Over Federal Parties' objections, the superior court did not allow
discovery in the case and did not enter any findings of fact. 30 Instead,
the court ordered the parties to submit briefs on the issues presented
by the legislation."' The court issued an unpublished decision on
August 30, 1996, in which it upheld parts of the legislation, struck
other sections as unconstitutional, and directed that still other
provisions could be applied prospectively.2 2 On September 30, 1996,
the superior court filed a certification of its decision with the Arizona
Supreme Court. 33 Due to "substantial" issues presented by the 1995
amendments to the state's water code, that certification requested the
Arizona .3
Supreme Court review the entirety of the superior court

decision. 231

B. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

In May 1997, nine months after the superior court certified its
decision, the Arizona Supreme Court accepted review of the superior
court decision and requested briefing from the parties. 231 In March
1998, nearly three years after the governor signed House Bills 2276
and 2193 into law, the court heard oral arguments on the case. 36 In an
unanimous opinion filed January 7, 1999, the court invalidated many
features of the bills on the grounds the legislation: (1) violated the
state constitution's due process clause by retroactively altering vested
rights; 237 (2) violated the separation of powers doctrine by controlling
the results of the pending water right adjudications;23 ' and (3)
exceeded the legislature's
tat ..
.. authority by improperly abolishing
. . 239 the
state's public trust obligations rooted in the state's constitution.
1. Due Process and Retroactivity
The Arizona Supreme Court first addressed whether various
229. See Special Action Proceedings, supra note 224.
230. Apache Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 163, at 3-4.
231. Id.
232. Special Action Proceedings, supra note 224; see Supreme Court To Review 1995
Statute, ARIz. GEN. STREAM ADJUDICATION BuLL. (Office of the Special Master), July
1997, at 1 (on file with author).
233. Apache Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 163, at 4.
234. Id. at 4-5.
235. Id. at 5.
236. See Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Special Action, Aiz. GEN. STREAM
ADJUDICATION BuLL. (Office of the Special Master), Jan.-Mar. 1998, at 1 (on file with
author). According to the Bulletin, three of the five members of the Arizona Supreme
Court recused themselves from the case for undisclosed reasons. Id. Three judges
from the Arizona Court of Appeals replaced those members. Id. Only two Arizona
Supreme Court justices, Chief Justice Tom Zlaket and Justice Stanley Feldman (who
had previously authored most of the court's water law decisions and who would author
this opinion) remained on the bench. Id.
237. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 189-90 (Ariz. 1999).
238. Id. at 196-97; see discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
239. San CarlosApache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 199. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
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provisions of the bills violated the state constitution's due process
clause. ' ° The Federal Parties argued the "procedural" amendments
and provisions altering past reserved rights settlements violated the
due process clause because they substantively and retroactively altered
vested property rights. 2 4' The court agreed that several provisions of
the legislation violated due process principles. 42
The court's analysis explored the nature of the rights involved, first
announcing that all of the water rights in the Gila and Little Colorado
general stream adjudications were "vested substantive property
rights. 2 4 ' According to the Arizona Supreme Court, priority among
water rights was a substantive aspect of the property right.2 44 Because
the purpose of adjudications was to "quantify, prioritize, and
document by decree existing priority rights to appropriable and
federally reserved water," the court concluded legislation that
retroactively altered the priority of water rights, including reserved
245
rights, in an adjudication necessarily violated due process.
In engaging in a section-by-section review of House Bill 2276, the
court first noted that the legislature expressly stated the "act applies to:
[a]ll rights to appropriable water initiated or perfected on or before the
effective date of this act and any rights subsequently initiated or
perfected. 2 4 6 While acknowledging the need to judge each section
independently, the court was persuaded this provision indicated
247 a
general intent to apply the statute's various provisions retroactively.
The court decided the legislation's provisions that increased the
protections against a court's finding of abandonment or forfeiture of
water rights violated state constitutional due process guarantees.
The court also concluded the provisions modifying the laws of adverse
possession of water rights violated due process because they too
modified vested priorities. Concerned by the legislature's attempt to
alter the rules while the adjudications were proceeding, the court
declared: "Substantive rights and consequent priorities cannot be
determined by statutes subsequently enacted, especially those enacted
while the case is pending before the court. 25 0 Finally, the court concluded
the reserved rights settlement provisions that re-vested appropriator
contributions were unconstitutional because, like the provisions
previously mentioned, they retroactively altered the consequences of
248

240. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 188.
241. Id.

242. Id.
243.
244.
245.
246.

36).

San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 189 (Ariz. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188 (quoting H.B. 2276, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws

247. Id. at 188.
248. Id. at 190-91.
249. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 190-91 (Ariz. 1999).
250. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
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past events. 5'
In an attempt to salvage part of the legislation, the State Parties
urged the court to uphold the water code amendments to the extent
they applied prospectively.252 In declining to do so, the court noted
although it would normally interpret statutes in a manner to uphold
their constitutionality, it remained convinced that a primary
motivation behind this legislation was to modify vested rights
retroactively. 253 In a separate attempt to salvage the prospective
provisions, the State Parties argued these amendments were simply a
clarification of the legislature's intent in the 1919 and 1974 water
codes.2 5' The court rejected this argument by stating any suggestion
"that the 1995 Legislature knows and can clarify what the 1919 or 1974
Legislatures intended carries us past the boundary of reality and into
the world of speculation." 255 Moreover, the court declared the
256
language of House Bill 2276 constituted a change not a clarification.
Therefore, despite the State Parties' attempts to protect the legislation,
the court concluded the "procedural" provisions violated due process
and were, therefore, invalid.
2. Separation of Powers
The court next addressed whether various portions of House Bill
2276 violated separation of powers principles. The Federal Parties
argued the lack of meaningful judicial review in the de minimis
provisions, quantity presumptions, and settlement decrees violated
separation of powers because the amendments effectively controlled
"both process and result [of water right adjudications] depriving the
court of its constitutional authority to find facts and to define and
apply the law." 257 The court agreed, concluding that because these
amendments intruded upon the province of the courts, they were
indeed unconstitutional.2
The court also commented on the legislature's timing, referencing
that the United States Supreme Court long ago faced a similar
situation in United States v. Klein,2 19 "in which Congress changed the
rules of the game at what may be described as halftime." 260 In Klein,

251.

Id. at 192. For a discussion of the provisions in House Bill 2276 pertaining to

reserved rights settlements see supra Part III.B.4.
252. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 193. The superior court, which had also
invalidated many of these same provisions, made this concession to the state parties.

Special Action Proceedings, supra note 224.
253.

San CarlosApache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 193.

254. Id. at 193-94.
255. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 193 (Ariz. 1999).
256. Id. at 194.
257. Id. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the de minimis provisions' potential
effects upon general streamwide adjudications. See supra Part III.B.4 for a discussion
of the settlement decree provision in House Bill 2276.
258. San CarlosApache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 195-97.
259. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
260.

San CarlosApache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 194.
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the administrator of a former confederate soldier's estate filed a claim61
the Civil War.
to recover property seized by the United States during
Just prior to Klein's claim, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
2 62
which held former confederate claimants were entitled to
Padelford,

receive their property if the United States President had issued them a
pardon. 263 Because the deceased soldier in Klein had been pardoned,
the trial court entered ajudgment in his favor and ordered the return
of his property. 264 The government subsequently appealed and, while
on appeal, Congress enacted a law that effectively overruled
Padelford.26 5 The government then moved to withdrawal the appeal,
The
arguing the new statute deprived the courts of jurisdiction.
Supreme Court refused to dismiss the appeal, finding the legislation
invalid because Congress overstepped its constitutional bounds by
passing legislation that effectively prescribed a result in a pending
case.
The Arizona Supreme Court analogized the situation in Klein to
the Arizona Legislature's enactment of House Bills 2276 and 2193 in
the midst of general stream adjudications. 268 The court concluded
"any attempt by the Arizona Legislature to adjudicate pending cases by
defining existing law and applying it to fact is prohibited by article III
of the Arizona Constitution .... 2 69 In affirming that separation of
powers ensured sufficient checks and balances to preserve each
branch's core functions, the court held the power to define existing
ongoing proceeding rested exclusively within the judicial
law in an
270
branch.

Applying these principles, the court held the de minimis use
provisions unconstitutional because "[t]he essential nature of the
is judicial." 271
power exercised [by the legislature] in [the provisions]
According to the court, the judiciary's role was to hear the facts,
consider the evidence, apply the law, and make the ultimate
conclusion in the context of each watershed. 272 "The practical effect of
the enactment, however, was to remove all possibility of meaningful
judicial conclusions based on findings of fact." 273 Thus, the legislature
impermissibly asserted control of the judicial function by directing the
courts to decree certain uses as de minimis, thereby dictating a specific

261.
262.

Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132.
United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).

263. Id. at 542-43.
264.

Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132.

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 146-47.
San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 194 (Ariz. 1999).
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 196.

272. Id.

273. Id.
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result in pending litigation.274
The court also invalidated the on-farm water duty, maximum
theoretical capacity, and prior filing presumptions on the separation
of powers ground.2- As with the de minimis provisions, the court was
troubled by the legislature's abrogation of the judiciary's fact-finding
role. 27" After reviewing the statute's presumption schemes, the court
declared each unconstitutional because each required courts to accept
certain quantities without an independent review of the facts. 277 The
court ruled that "[t]he [1]egislature may not require a court to reach
and decree factual conclusions based on legislative determinations
rather than actual facts...
particularly ...when the statute affects
78
pending case decisions.
3. The Public Trust as a Constitutional Doctrine
Perhaps the most surprising decision the court made in San Carlos
was to invalidate the legislative provisions abrogating the public trust
doctrine on constitutional grounds. 279 The superior court upheld the
public trust prohibition, reasoning that because the legislature created
the special adjudication process to determine quantity and priority of
rights, it could similarly
restrict the issues to be tried by excluding the
280
public trust doctrine. The superior court relied on Idaho Conservation
League v. State28' for the proposition that where it is "established that
rights to use water subject to the general stream adjudication are held
subject to the public trust," the doctrine need not be part of a water
right adjudication.282
The Arizona Supreme Court disagreed with the superior court,
holding "[t]he public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on
legislative power to give away resources held by the state in trust for its
people." 28 3 Because of the doctrine's constitutional status, the judiciary
had the obligation to decide whether the doctrine applied to the facts
of cases before it.214 Consequently, the court concluded the legislature

274. San Carlos Apache Tribe v.Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 196 (Ariz. 1999).
275. Id. at 196-97.
276. Id.
277. Id. The court held that the on-farm water duty presumption failed because "the
factual determination of quantities needed for certain crops and elevations must be
judicially determined on the basis of evidence." Id. at 196. Similarly, the maximum
capacity rules prevented "the court from basing its judgment on the amount of water
actually diverted or stored and thus beneficially used." Id. at 197. The court
invalidated the prior filing presumption provision because it precluded "the court
from determining the credibility of the information in the prior filings." Id.
278. Id. at 197.
279. See id. at 199.
280. Special Action Proceedings, supra note 224.
281. For a discussion of Idaho Conservation League see notes 114-16 and
accompanying text.
282. Special Action Proceedings, supra note 224.
283. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999).
284. Id.
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could not destroy this unavoidable constitutional obligation.
While the court's opinion suggests the public trust doctrine applies
generally to water rights issues, the court noted the public trust
doctrine may not be implicated in every water right claim." 6 Instead,
must be made by a
the decision about the applicability of the doctrine
2 7
court based upon the specific facts before it.1
Unfortunately, the court did not supply much reasoning with its
holding. 8 It did not, for example, specify whether the doctrine was a
state constitutional doctrine,289 or a federal constitutional obligation
that the state assumed upon statehood.20 In addition, the court did
not indicate whether public interest groups would have standing to
challenge water right claims that infringed on public trust values, or
whether the responsibility to uphold the state's public trust doctrine
fell solely upon the judge hearing the adjudication. Moreover, while
the court indicated that the public trust doctrine could affect a water
right claim in a water right adjudication,2 1 the court provided no
285. Id.
286. Id. The court stated: "While the [public trust doctrine] issue has been raised
before the master, we do not yet know if the doctrine applies to all, some, or none of
the claims. That determination depends upon the facts before ajudge." Id.
287. Id.
288. The court's opinion on the public trust doctrine was just two paragraphs long,
with the first paragraph simply a restatement of the pertinent part of the offending
legislation. Id.
289. The court did not indicate where in the state constitution the public trust
doctrine was grounded. Rather, in its analysis, the court cited and thereby presumably
adopted the analysis of an earlier appellate decision, Arizona Centerfor Law in the Public
Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). San Carlos Apache Tribe v.
Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999). In Hassell, the Arizona Court of
Appeals held the legislature could not pass a statute allowing the state to dispose of the
beds of navigable waters to private parties. Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v.
Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 173 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). In making this determination, the
appeals court noted that a conveyance of this type would be unconstitutional under
the gift clause in Article IX, Section 7 of the Arizona Constitution and the public trust
doctrine. Id. at 166-71. The appeals court analyzed three sources as giving rise to the
public trust doctrine in Arizona. Id. at 168-69. First, it stated: "From Illinois Central,
we derive the proposition that the state's responsibility to administer its watercourse
lands for the public benefit is an inabrogable attribute of statehood itself." Id. at 168.
Second, the appeals court noted that the "law of public trust lies in our constitutional
commitment to the checks and balances of a government of divided powers." Id.
Finally, the appeals court indicated that the gift clause provided a framework for
public trust review. Id. at 169.
290. See Blumm et. al, supra note 110, at 479-96 (arguing that the public trust
doctrine cannot be abrogated because it (1) is an incident of statehood; (2) is
inherent in state sovereignty; and (3) is a state constitutional doctrine).
291. State water right claimants are likely to disagree with this statement, pointing to
the court's own admission in the opinion that it did "not yet know if the doctrine
applies to all, some, or none of the claims." San Carlos Apache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 199
(emphasis added). However, the issue of whether the doctrine will apply to a specific
claim is distinct from deciding whether the doctrine applies generally to water right
adjudications. Indeed, the court unequivocally stated: "It is for the courts to decide
whether the public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts." Id. Had the Arizona
Supreme Court not intended the public trust doctrine to apply generally to water right
claims or adjudications, it simply would have ended its analysis by stating that the
legislation was invalid because it abrogated a constitutional limit on the legislature.
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guidance to trial courts as to the public trust values at stake, or how to
determine which claims, if any, the doctrine affected. Nonetheless,
despite the ambiguities left by the opinion, the court did make clear
that the legislature and courts had an undeniable constitutional
obligation to protect the public's rights to the water.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF SAN CARLOS
Although the Arizona Supreme Court in San Carlos used state
constitutional law to invalidate particular provisions of the state's water
code, the effects of the court's holdings may not be limited to Arizona.
Other western state courts are likely to profit from the decision
because it addresses three of the most important contemporary water
issues facing western courts and legislatures alike. First, as competition
for water grows among current users, the federal government, and the
tribes, San Carlos serves as a reminder that federal and tribal water
rights are vested property rights. Although these rights remain rooted
in a legally distinct federal doctrine, they are no less deserving of legal
protection by state courts than state-created prior appropriation
rights. 92 Second, as states work to incorporate senior reserved rights
claims into current management of water resources, San Carlos adds
clarity to the limits on judicial and legislative powers to apportion and
manage state and federal water rights. " Finally, as the public becomes
more aware of the need to preserve water resources for non-extractive
uses, San Carlos reminds other state legislatures of their constitutional
public trust obligations. 94
A. RECOGNITION OF RESERVED RIGHTS AS VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS

Most apparent in the court's due process analysis of the legislation
at issue, San Carlos affirms the proposition that tribal and federal water
rights are vested water rights.
According to the court, "[a] vested
right is 'actually assertable as a legal cause of action or defense or is so
substantially relied upon that retroactive divestiture would be
manifestly unjust. ' ' 16 In order to determine whether the legislation
was unconstitutional on retroactivity grounds, the court first
considered whether reserved rights were, in fact, vested property
rights. The court easily concluded that, indeed, "the water rights of
the parties in the... general stream adjudications are vested
substantive property rights."297
However, by taking the analysis one step further to indicate that the doctrine's
applicability involves a fact-specific endeavor, the Arizona Supreme Court implied that
water is a public resource protected by the public trust doctrine, consideration of
which comprises an essential element of any water right adjudication.
292. See discussion infra Part V.A.
293. See discussion infra Part V.B.
294. See discussion infra Part V.C.
295. See San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 189 (Ariz. 1999).
296. Id. (quoting Hall v. A.N.R. Freight Sys., 717 P.2d 434, 444 (Ariz. 1986)).
297. San CarlosApache Tribe, 972 P.2d. at 189.
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This result demonstrates that, as vested property rights, federal and
tribal claims are entitled to the same state court protection as other
state conferred property rights. Although the Arizona legislation did
not directly alter reserved rights principles, it did threaten the priority
status of reserved rights claims.9 After declaring priority a substantive
part of any water right,2 99 the court announced that legislation that

retroactively altered the priority of water rights in an adjudication was
unconstitutional. 00 Because the priority of state water rights is relative
to the priority of federal water rights, the court could not allow the
state legislature to elevate state water priorities over federal water
rights. Therefore, even though reserved water rights are grounded in
federal law, San Carlos demonstrates that they are undeniable property
rights which state legislatures cannot destroy.
B. THE LEGISLATURE'S ROLE IN WATER RIGHT ADJUDICATIONS
The central issue in San Carlos revolved around whether state
legislatures could prevent tribal, federal, and public claims from
reallocating water away from existing users and traditional uses.
Historically, state courts have allowed state legislatures and agencies to
protect traditional uses by selectively implementing and enforcing
water code provisions.'s° Indeed, in many instances, state courts have
ignored rules of prior appropriation in order to avoid displacing a
current water use.*°0 In this regard, San Carlos is notable because it is
the first court decision to declare legislation specifically designed to
protect current users as unconstitutional.3 3 Thus, it offers insights into
the limits on judicial and legislative decision-making.
The San Carlos parties, in their opening briefs, acknowledged the
importance of this case in determining the limits of the state
legislature's authority to control adjudication procedures to reach
politically favorable outcomes. The tribes asked the Arizona Supreme
Court to "send a clear and unequivocal message to the litigants who
had the power to draft and enact this partisan and unconstitutional
legislation, but who lacked the will power or wisdom to resist such
temptation."0 04 The cities of Phoenix, Chandler, Glendale, Mesa, and
Scottsdale suggested that "[t] he general stream adjudication process is
a particularly inappropriate area for this Court to draw fine-line
distinctions as to the relative powers of each branch of state
298. See discussion supra Part III.B.
299. San CarlosApache Tribe, 972 P.2d at 189.
300. Id. at 189-90.
301. See Benson, supra note 126, at 888-906.
302. Id.
Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d
303. See, e.g.,
568, 576-77 (Okla. 1990) (holding legislation requiring riparian water right holders to
conform to a permit system, which only recognized rights in actual water use, was an
unconstitutional taking of property because the riparian rights doctrine entails a
continuing right to use appurtenant water even if the water currently is not being
used).
304. Apache Petitioners' Opening Brief, supra note 163, at 74.

WATER LA W REVIEW

Volume 4

government when the interaction of all is necessary to provide litigants
with a comprehensive system."" 5 While the court conceded powers of
the legislature and courts often blended, °6 it concluded the legislation
retroactively altered vested rights0 7 and violated separation of
powers.30 ' This result demonstrates that fine lines can be drawn in the
allocation of water rights in general stream adjudications.
The Arizona Supreme Court recognized that constitutional
principles demanded the judiciary, not the legislature, engage in the
fact intensive determinations required in general streamwide
adjudications. According to San Carlos, state legislatures are quite
limited in their ability to shape and define water allocations in general
streamwide adjudications because of due process and separation of
powers limits.
Due process prohibits state legislatures from amending state water
codes in a manner that alters the relative priority or quantity of stategranted water rights.3°
Because water rights are correlative, the
legislature cannot alter vested water rights, regardless of whether
doing so improves the priority or increases the quantity of a water
right '° Rather, only courts, after a hearing, may shift the relative
priorities and quantities of water rights. Recognizing this limitation,
the court refused to give effect to the new legislation because
"[s]ubstantive rights and consequent priorities cannot be determined
by statutes subsequently enacted ....3" Because the legislation at
issue altered state-based rights at the expense of federally-based rights,
San Carlos posits that due process limitations apply to both types of
property rights. San Carlos, therefore, stands for the proposition that
state legislatures may not constitutionally alter statutes defining water
rights if doing so would upset water rights claimants' expectations
created by state or federal law.
Under separation of powers principles, the court found state
legislation which determines the outcome of pending adjudications
constitutionally repugnant."s2 While the court suggested the legislature

305. Cities' Opening Brief at 24, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972
P.2d 179 (Ariz. 1999) (No. CV-95-0161-SA) (on file with author).
306. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 195 (Ariz. 1999).
307. Id. at 189.
308. Id. at 194-97.
309. Id. at 189.
310. The use of the word "correlative" refers to the phenomenon that occurs when a
government uses a property right system to allocate the use of a finite resource.
Where a party holds a property right to a limited resource and exercises the right to
use that resource, the subsequent use will necessarily be to the exclusion of others.
One appropriator's use will diminish the amount of water available for other users. To
ensure an equitable distribution among claimants, western states have relied on
temporal priority and reasonable use rules to limit the quantity of water used. See
discussion supra Part II.A. Consequently, once these rights have been established, any
change by the state resulting in an increase in priority or quantity of one water user's
rights will necessarily mean a reduction in another water user's rights.
311. San CarlosApache Tibe, 972 P.2d at 190.
312. Id. at 194.
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may collect facts and pass new water laws within due process
constraints previously discussed, it could not pass legislation that both
defined the law and applied it to facts under litigation. 13 As illustrated
by the court's invalidation of the de minimis provisions, state
legislatures cannot completely remove water rights disputes from the
province of the courts because the power to hear facts, consider
evidence, apply the law, and make ultimate conclusions in pending
disputes are judicial functions.314 Consequently, the court limited the
legislature's ability to impact water allocation decisions to statutes that
apply prospectively, and without disturbing vested property rights.
C. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IS A CONSTITUTIONAL WATER RIGHT
DOCTRINE

The San Carlos court may have dramatically changed the future of
water rights in Arizona when it declared the public trust doctrine a
constitutional limitation that could apply to a water right.1 6 While the
court was not the first to declare the public trust a constitutional
doctrine,1 7 it was the first to do so in the face of such strong opposition
by the legislature.
San Carlos asserts that, as a constitutional doctrine, a legislature
cannot extinguish, nor can the courts i nore, the application of the
The court's decision is,
public trust doctrine to water rights.
in Arizona. Due to its
controversy
much
generate
therefore, likely to
questions. In the
unanswered
many
left
brevity, the court's opinion
whether
to
determine
upon
called
be
will
near future, Arizona courts
water
granted
it
when
the state violated its public trust obligations
general
on-going
two
of
the
context
the
rights to appropriators. In
streamwide adjudications, Arizona courts will also need to determine
who represents the public trust in adjudications. For example, will the
courts simply assume the public trust role, ensuring their decrees are
mindful of the state's public trust obligations, or will they allow public
interest groups to intervene and challenge certain water users' rights
on the basis of the public trust?
The court's decision will likely have an effect on other western
states. The most immediate effect could be felt in Idaho. In 1995, the
Idaho legislature passed a bill similar to the Arizona legislation that
Although the
removed the state's public trust doctrine obligations.
Idaho courts had yet to decide the origin of the state's public trust
doctrine, the Idaho legislature declared the public trust doctrine a

313. Id.
314. Id. at 196.
315. Id. at 189.
316. Id. at 199.
317. See supra note 86 for a list of courts finding the public trust doctrine a
constitutional obligation.
318. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999).
319. H.B. 794, 53d Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 1147 (codified at
IDAHO CODE §§ 58-1201 to -1203 (Michie 2000)).
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common law doctrine, and, therefore, alterable by legislative action. °
While the Idaho legislation has yet to be challenged, similarities
between the Idaho and Arizona anti-public trust legislation suggest
that a similar fate may be awaiting the Idaho legislation. Like the San
Carlos court, the Idaho Supreme Court could conclude that the public
trust doctrine derives not from common law doctrine, but rather from
the constitution. Certainly, the Idaho Supreme Court would not be
bound by the Arizona Supreme Court's decision. Nonetheless, San
Carlos should prove to be persuasive authority.
San Carlos is likely to be persuasive in other jurisdictions as well. In
recent years, the public has become more aware of the need for instream water for fish and wildlife, water quality, and channel
maintenance. Similarly, the public's values have expanded beyond
commodity water uses to include other valuable uses, such as
recreation and aesthetics. Consequently, more suits are likely to be
filed, challenging various water rights on the basis of the public trust
doctrine. As these suits progress, state courts will likely look to San
Carlosfor guidance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The allocation of water among prior appropriators, reserved rights
claimants, and public trust values exists as one of the most pressing
issues western states currently face. With a high demand for and a
limited supply of water, states stand in the unenviable position of
apportioning this limited resource among various user groups, who
claim rights based on both state and federal law. Historically, states
have relied upon the system of prior appropriation to allocate this
scarce and unreliable resource. This system has given current water
users some certainty in their water rights. However, as tribes, the
federal government, and the public begin to assert paramount claims,
the legal landscape, which current water users now enjoy, will become
as uncertain as the natural precipitation cycle of the arid West.
Many current users, to recapture some certainty once felt, have
turned to their state legislatures for help. Armed with notions of
property rights, economic reliance, and concerns that environmental
interest is eroding western ranching and farming, appropriators in
both Arizona and Idaho successfully lobbied for protective legislation.
Such legislation was designed to insulate existing water users from the
threat posed by reserved rights and the public trust doctrine. San
Carlos, however, demonstrates that this legislation will fail for three
reasons.
First, any attempt by the legislation to retroactively alter respective
priorities and quantities of water rights, whether based on state or
federal law, violates due process guarantees found in both federal and
state constitutions. Because priority date comprises an essential
element of every water right, and water right priorities cannot be
320.

Id. (codified at

IDAHO CODE §

58-1201(4) (Michie 2000)).
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determined without looking to the priority dates of surrounding water
rights, states must afford all affected parties due process before
changing a priority date. Such due process can only be satisfied in a
court of law, not in the legislature.
Second, such legislation will surely be an overreaching of the
legislature's constitutional power. Because courts, not legislatures, are
constitutionally vested with the authority to decide cases and define
competing property rights, any attempt by the legislature to favor one
type of water right claimant over another will violate separation of
powers principles.
Third, where legislation compromises public trust doctrine
obligations, it is unconstitutional. Rooted in the constitution, the
public trust doctrine stands as an obligation that state legislatures can
neither avoid nor destroy.
In summary, San Carlos, in its basic form, signals to other courts
that state legislatures should be constitutionally prevented from
State
altering private property rights of water rights holders.
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manage
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individual
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that reserved rights are vested property rights or that the public trust
doctrine is rooted in the constitution must necessarily fail.

